


THE FUGELMAN



**THE NEWSLETTER OF THE SECOND
WISCONSIN VOLUNTEER INFANTRY
ASSOCIATION
THE BLACK HAT BRIGADE---THE IRON BRIGADE
1861-1865**

VOLUME XXVII

ISSUE 4 APRIL, 2017

**FU-GEL-MAN: A well-drilled soldier placed in front of a military company as a model or
guide for others.**

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PASS IN REVIEW

From the quill of Lt. Colonel Pete Seielstad



I must thank our kind editor for excusing me from my obligation to write an article for our most celebrated newsletter last month. It wasn't that I had nothing to say; it was that I had too much to say and the task at hand was not yet completed.

THE LA CROSSE LIGHT GUARD FLAG

Earlier this year, I wrote in my *pass in review* article about the Light Guard Flag and asked, "What will be the future of this antebellum emblem of La Crosse men and women?" Members of the 2nd Wisconsin Association, Company B, 2nd Wisconsin CWR, had taken up the challenge to preserve the flag for future generations. After receiving custodianship from the Governors Guard Association in 1994, Company B, saw to the continuance of perpetual care for the Light Guard Flag. Finally, it became apparent to all involved that the best course of action was to remove the flag from La Crosse and find a new home at the Wisconsin Veterans Museum (WVM), in Madison.

I am pleased to announce that the flag has found a new home at the Wisconsin Veterans Museum. A proud symbol of the La Crosse Light Guard, the flag will now rest in the repository of other symbols of service and sacrifice of Wisconsin men and women.

It was not without a bittersweet emotion. On March 10th, 2017, after years in the care of two great La Crosse organizations, the American Legion Post 52 and the La Crosse County Historic Society (LCHS), the flag was taken down from the wall at the LCHS building and transported to Madison.

On the occasion, members of American Legion Post 52, La Crosse Historical Society and Co. B, 2nd Wisconsin were present. Post 52 offered a salute in reverence as it was taken from its sanctuary. Physically handling the moving preparations were members of the WVM and Co. B, 2nd Wisconsin: John Dudkiewicz, Pete Scielstad and Robert Taunt. To greet the La Crosse Light Guard Flag in Madison was another 2nd Wisconsin Association member, Kevin Hampton.

Well done gentlemen, well done.

End Note: The La Crosse Light Guard Flag is now displayed in the gallery at the WVM. Its official unveiling and presentation is scheduled for May 2nd, 2017.

SHILOH

Communication from the Shiloh event was at first; slow to announce anything other than what was placed on the event's web site. To date, I can announce that the 2nd Wisconsin men will be brigaded with the Army of Ohio and under the command of Col. Tim Bills. We will be in the 3rd Brigade commanded by Mike Lavis. It is unclear as to our historic portrayal as we may be involved in several different scenarios during the event. Therefore we should prepare ourselves to attend as 'Western' soldiers; a little worse for wear, but with an attitude of confidence.

There is a battle on Friday, but it is mostly geared for cavalry. It may be a far reach to attend this action, as our battalion will be still coming on the field by late afternoon. Saturday morning we will begin our march at 0530 and be in the field for a better part of the day. Knowing this, prepare your haversack with at least a day's ration. In regards to ammunition, Mike Lavis likes to answer to the sound of gunfire. I strongly suggest your

ammunition supply reflect a willingness to fight; a minimum of 150 to 200 rounds should do it.

Weather is always a challenge. I have requisitioned a fair supply of warm and pleasant conditions for the event. We'll see if the Quartermaster Sargent can fill my request. If not, rain gear, warm under-drawers and woolen mittens should find its way into your knapsack. Finding a quilt on a clothesline, hence not in current use, may be taken from any Secessionist household.

Your obedient servant,



Lt. Col. Pete Seielstad

CAMPAIGN SCHEDULES OF THE COMPANIES AND ASSOCIATION

APRIL

6th-9th	Shiloh National Reenactment (National Max effort)	Shiloh, TN.
22nd	Spring Drill - Wallys Farm or Waterloo H.S. (Co.K)	Waterloo, WI.
22nd	Co.E Spring Drill & Annual Dinner (Co.E)	Green Bay
22rd & 23rd	2nd WI Skirmish & 114th (N-SSA) (Skirmish team)	Springfield, IL
29th & 30th	Grant's Home Front (Assoc Max Effort)	Galena, IL.

REGIMENTAL DISPATCHES



APRIL, 1865

One hundred and fifty-two years ago this month, April, 1865, saw the United States undergo a roller coaster ride of emotions. On April 9th, the northern states were wildly celebrating what was clearly the end of the war with the collapse of the Army of Northern Virginia, the mighty army under the command of General Robert E. Lee. It is hard to imagine the joy and happiness with which this news was received. After four years of unprecedented death and destruction the war was finally grinding to a halt.

It is difficult to imagine the sense of relief that President Lincoln felt at the successful conclusion to a long war. But Lincoln only had 5 days to live.

The assassination of President Lincoln at around 10:00 p.m. on April 14th, 1865, and his death the next morning at 7:22 a.m. crashed the sense of euphoria in the north and created a huge sense of loss and grief. It is one of the most tragic events in American history with far reaching repercussions!

By April 26th, 1865, when John Wilkes Booth, the assassin, was shot and killed, the government had already arrested the eight people who would stand trial for being part of the conspiracy to kill the President, Secretary of State, William Seward; and the Vice-president, Andrew Johnson.

Thus there is much to remember and commemorate this April.

A CEREMONY, INVITATION & DEDICATION OF THE COMPANY B, LACROSSE LIGHT GUARD FLAG

Our colleague, John Dudkiewicz provided the following dispatch. Please note the invitation to join in the ceremony at the Wisconsin Veterans' Museum officially transferring the flag to the museum. This is a very special ceremonial event and the Editor calls on our members to join our comrades and support this commemoration!

**La Crosse Light Guard Flag - Donated by Legion Post #52 to the
Wisconsin Veterans Museum**

- 1. A ceremony was held Wednesday March 8 at the La Crosse County Historical Society Offices and Archives Building. It was attended by members of Legion Post #52, LCHS and Co B. Short speeches were presented by Peggy Derrick - LCHS Curator, Pete Seielstad and John Dudkiewicz. Cake and other snacks were served**
- 2. Representatives of the Wisconsin Veterans Museum arrived Friday March 10 to transfer the flag. Pete, John and Bob were present and assisted in preparing the flag, and loading into the transfer vehicle. The flag left La Crosse approximately noon. Pictures were texted to Pete, and forwarded to John during the meeting, showing the flag**

arrived safely and was being prepared for display in Madison at the Veterans Museum.

The La Crosse Light Guard Flag was made by the Ladies of La Crosse, and given to the La Crosse Light Guard July 4, 1860. It accompanied the men to Madison in 1861 and Washington later that year. It was stored in Washington, to be returned to La Crosse after the war. It was refurbished in 1930 by Nannie Colwell, daughter to Wilson Colwell, and hung in the La Crosse Courthouse until it was torn down. Since then it was alternately stored and displayed at the American Legion Post #52 and the La Crosse Historical Society Buildings after being professionally conserved in 1994, organized and paid for by Company B, 2nd Wisconsin Civil War Reenactors. It is now in the Wisconsin Veterans Museum in Madison

The Veterans Museum is planning an official welcome ceremony for the Light Guard Flag at the Museum in Madison Tuesday May 2nd, 2017 at 5:30 pm. This date was chosen by Legion Post #52 as the approximate date in 1861 that the flag may have arrived at the Wisconsin State Fairgrounds with the La Crosse Light Guard. All 2nd Wisconsin Members are invited to attend in Uniform.



Members of Legion Post #52, La Crosse County Historical Society and Company B at the Flag Farewell Ceremony, March 8, 2017, LCCHS offices and Archives



Pvt. Scott Hiser, Co B, 2nd Wisconsin Civil War Reenactors with the Original Light Guard Flag, and the 1997 replica (Standing in the corner) March 8, 2017



The Original Light Guard Flag, packaged for moving, being removed from the LCHS offices. March 10, 2017



Light Guard Flag arrives at Wisconsin Veterans Museum, Madison, March 8, 2017



Light Guard Flag on Temporary Display at Wisconsin Veterans Museum, March 13, 2017

ATTENTION TO ORDERS

ASSOCIATION SCHOLARSHIP APPLICATION

A reminder that the clock is ticking for members of the Association and their family to submit their application for the Association's scholarship program. The deadline is May 31st, 2017.

This year there will be a 1,000 dollar and a 500 dollar scholarship awarded to the successful applicants. These are significant sums at a time when the costs for college tuition remains quite expensive.

Each application must include a 500 word essay on the topic: "Some Wisconsin soldiers changed their opinion of African-Americans during the course of the war. What experiences may have led to these changes"? This is an interesting and challenging topic I think most of us would agree! You can find the application at the close of this newsletter.

BROCHURE FOR THE COMPANY B FLAG AND ITS REMOVAL TO WISCONSIN VETERANS MUSEUM

At the end of this months newsletter readers will find a copy (not entirely exact) of a brochure prepared about the original Company B flag recently donated to the Wisconsin Veterans' Museum. Our Lt. Col. asked that it be included in the newsletter so that it gets out to all our members. The editor was glad to comply. It is really nicely done with a good summary of the history of the Company and the service of the Second Wisconsin Regiment during the War of the Rebellion. I hope yyou enjoy it as much as the Editor did!

GRANT'S HOME FRONT EVENT IN GALENA, ILLINOIS



April 29th and 30th, 2017b, is the fourth Grant's Home Front event in Galena, Illinois. This event is in one of the most beautiful locations one could imagine. The community is a wonderfully restored downtown that reflects a mid-nineteenth appearance. The park where the event is held in along the river and also is a beautiful spot for reenactors. The park is within walking distance of the town so it is easy to find rations and libations to restore the body and soothe the soul of the troops during the event.

As all of us know, Galena was Grant's home when the Civil War broke out. Grant was working in his father's leather store as a clerk at the time. This event is intended to honor Lt. Gen. Grant in his hometown. One of the reasons this event is as good as it is results from the fact that the event is organized and conducted by reenactors for reenactors. It should also be noted that this community goes all out to make reenactors feel welcomed in the community!

The event also draws large crowds. Last year over 4,000 visitors wandered through the camps and watched the battles.

The event includes tours during the day of Grant's home (a special treat), a fashion show for the ladies, and afternoon dance, and battles each day of the event. (A schedule of the events follows)

Amenities during the event include a home cooked breakfast on Saturday morning. Attendees will receive discounts from city restaurants for folks in period dress. There will also be special camping for our civilian groups.

EVENT SCHEDULE

SATURDAY:

9:00 am Living History Camps Open
11:30 am - Battle of Fever River
10:00-5:00 Sanitary Fair & Bazaar - Activity Tent
3:00 Dance in the Activity Tent
5:00 Camps Close




SUNDAY:

9:00 am Period 1860's Church Service in Activity Tent
10:00 Camps Open
10:00 -2:30 Sanitary Fair & Bazaar - Activity Tent
11:00 Galena Soldiers Aid Society Meeting
to be followed by Ladies Tea and Entertainment
1:30 pm. - Battle of Fever River
2:30 pm - Camps Close

**FROM THE CAMPS OF THE
COMPANIES OF THE SECOND
WISCONSIN**

INFANTRY



COMPANY E



TO ARMS!

DRILL! DRILL! DRILL!



SOLDIERS OF THE COMPANY!



**Your Officers and Non-commissioned Officers request your participation in
Drill;
for the Safety of our Comrades; for the Pride of our Company;
St. Mark's Church on the 22d Instant of April 2017.**

It is recommended that we meet to improve upon our Profession as Volunteer Soldiers in the United States Army.

This will be a general Company Drill— all members are encouraged to attend.

Non-Commissioned Officers should arrive at least one-quarter to the hour of the Roll.

Soldiers should be present to answer the Roll at 9:00 a.m. Please make an effort, *if possible*, to arrive early so we may commence directly at 9:00 a.m.

Brogans are not allowed inside the Gymnasium - please bring alternate footwear.

COMPANY K


SPRING DRILL!

Company K will hold its third and final spring drill on April, 22nd, inst. Beginning at 9:00 a.m., weather permitting, this drill will take place in the outdoors on the farm of Wally Ilban, as is the custom for members of Company K. In the event of inclement weather the drill will be conducted at the Waterloo High School.

The men should be in uniform with all their accoutrements. It is imperative to bring your rifle and bayonet. If the weather is bad the drill will be in the gym and the troops will need soft soled shoes. Otherwise wear your brogans for drill in the great outdoors. If the drill is conducted on Wally's farm you will need a handful of cartridges and caps as there will be firings during the drill.

As always make sure you have a full canteen or other source of water during the drill!

ARTILLERY



SKIRMISHERS



40 ROUNDS SKIRMISH – APRIL 21-23, 2017

The 114th Illinois Volunteer Infantry and the 2nd Wisconsin Infantry are proud to host a joint Western Region N-SSA and ACWSA Skirmish at the Lefthanders Gun Club, 9364 Rhea Road, Loami, Illinois. This is just a few miles west of Springfield. Skirmishers approaching Springfield on I-55 will want to take the I-72/36 West exit on the south side of Springfield (Exit 92 A-B) and head west towards Jacksonville until you reach the Loami exit, then proceed west through the community of Curran and then a few miles further to the Loami/Bates Road. Turn left (south) across the railroad tracks and then go another 3.5 miles to the village of Loami. Follow the road around to the west side of Loami and turn right at the Shell station onto the West Loami Road. In about 1.5 miles you welcome to a crossroads and will see a sign pointing south to the Lefthanders Gun Club. Go south $\frac{3}{4}$ mile and turn left into the Lefthanders drive to the range.

2nd WISCONSIN REGIMENTAL FIELD HOSPITAL



BELLEVUE HOSPITAL MEDICAL COLLEGE:

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE SUBMITTED BY STAN GRAIEWSKI

Bellevue Hospital Medical College opened its doors in the spring of 1861, with the following physicians as faculty: Stephen Smith, Frank H. Hamilton, James R. Wood, Alexander B. Mott, Lewis A. Sayre, Isaac E. Taylor, Fordyce Barker, George T. Elliot, Jr., Benjamin W. McCready, J.W. S. Gouley, Austin Flint, Austin Flint, Jr., and Robert O. Doremus.

The original building was on the grounds of Bellevue Hospital, but the school soon realized they needed a larger building, and in 1865-66, a larger building, also on the hospital grounds, was erected at 419-21 East 26th Street. In addition to serving as the home for the College, the facility was also used by the Bureau of Medical and Surgical Relief for the Out-Door Poor.

During the Civil War, physicians from Bellevue Hospital Medical College, under the auspices of the United States Sanitary Commission, published several monographs for Army surgeons, such as Stephen Smith's piece on "Amputations." Faculty members also played significant roles on New York City's Council of Hygiene and Public Health, whose landmark report on the sanitary condition of the city led to the establishment in 1866 of the New York City Department of Health.

The surgery department was strong. It included prominent doctors such as Lewis Sayre, who was the first professor of orthopedic surgery in the country. In 1854 he performed the first successful resection of the hip joint in the United States. Frank Hamilton was an authority on fractures, and wrote the first complete and comprehensive treatise in English on the subject.

In the 1880's Andrew Carnegie donated a large sum of money to the college, and the Carnegie Laboratory, the first in the country established for teaching and investigation in bacteriology and pathology, opened for the 1884-85 school year.

In 1897, New York State Regents ranked the University Medical College (NYU) lowest of the 12 schools whose graduates they examined for license to practice in the state, leading the University to assume direct control over the College. In that same year, the Bellevue Hospital Medical College was partially destroyed by fire, leading NYU to suggest a merger of the two schools. Bellevue accepted, and the new University and Bellevue Hospital Medical College opened October 1, 1898. The merger included the transfer of all equipment and buildings, including the Carnegie Laboratory. Famous alumni of the Bellevue Hospital Medical College include Walter Reed, William Crawford Gorgas, Herman Biggs, and Joseph Goldberger, among others.

<https://archives.med.nyu.edu/collections/bellevue-hospital-medical-college-guide-records>

CIVIL WAR MILESTONES

APRIL

Apr. 1, 1865

The Battle of Five Forks.

Apr. 2, 1865

Gen. A. P. Hill is killed as Lee is forced to evacuate Petersburg.

Apr. 3, 1865

Jefferson Davis sets up a temporary capitol in Danville, Virginia.

Apr. 5, 1865

Secretary of State William Seward is critically injured in a carriage accident.

Apr. 6, 1865

Battle of Sailor's Creek, where Union forces took 8,000 prisoners including General Richard Ewell and Gen. R. E. Lee's son Custis.

Apr. 4, 1864

Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan assumes command of the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry Corps.

Apr. 6, 1864

Meeting in New Orleans, the Louisiana Constitutional Convention adopts a new state constitution abolishing slavery.

Apr. 7, 1864

The U.S. Senate approves the 13th Amendment

Apr. 7, 1865

Tennessee ratifies the 13th Amendment.

Apr. 7, 1865

Gen. Grant writes Lee asking him to surrender.

Apr. 8, 1865

Grant receives Lee's reply, asking for terms. Skirmishing occurs during the day and Custer's cavalry captures Confederate supply trains at Appomattox Station. Lee holds final war council on this night.

Apr. 9, 1865

Robert E. Lee agrees to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia.

Apr. 10, 1865

The Confederate government flees from Danville.

Apr. 12, 1861

At 4:30 a.m. Confederates under Gen. Pierre Beauregard open fire with 50 cannons upon Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina. The Civil War begins.

Apr. 12, 1864

Confederate General Nathan B. Forrest captures Fort Pillow in Tennessee and the result has been called a massacre given the slaughter of black troops at the fort. Forrest was also accused of taking advantage of a flag of truce to improve his positions to attack the fort.

Apr. 12, 1865

Mobile, the last major city in the Confederacy surrenders.

Apr. 12, 1865

In Greensboro, N. C., Jefferson Davis meets with Gen. Johnston, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard and his cabinet, and authorizes Johnston to negotiate peace terms with Gen. Sherman.

Apr. 14, 1865

At 10:00 p.m. John Wilkes Booth will enter the Presidential box at Ford's Theater and fire a bullet into

the brain of Abraham Lincoln. Booth would successfully manage to escape from the theater and be on the run for 12 days.

Apr. 15, 1861

President Lincoln issues call for 75,000 volunteers.

Apr. 15, 1865

At 7:22 a.m. President Lincoln would succumb to the wound inflicted by Booth the night before. Lincoln would die in a small boarding room at the Peterson House. His death would unleash massive scenes of mourning across his beloved Union!

Apr. 17, 1861

Virginia secedes from the Union, followed within five weeks by Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina, thus forming an eleven state Confederacy with a population of 9 million, including nearly 4 million slaves. The Union will soon have 21 states and a population of over 20 million.

Apr. 17, 1864

Lt. Gen. Grant ends prisoner exchanges with the Confederate army.

Apr. 18, 1865

Sherman and Johnston agree to an armistice in Durham, N. C.

Apr. 19, 1865

Lincoln funeral service in the East Room of the White House.

Apr. 20, 1827

Gen. John Gibbon, USA, born.

Apr. 20, 1864

The U.S. War Department reduces rations for rebel prisoners in response to reports that the Confederates are mistreating Union prisoners.

Apr. 21, 1865

Lincoln Funeral Train leaves Washington City.

Apr. 22, 1864

“In God We Trust” becomes the official motto on U.S. coins under the new Federal Coinage Act.

Apr. 26, 1865

Union cavalry and national detectives would track John Wilkes Booth to a tobacco barn on the Richard Garret farm near Bowling Green, Virginia . After refusing to surrender the barn was set ablaze and during the stand-off Booth was shot and mortally wounded.

Apr. 26, 1865

In Durham N. C., Johnston officially surrenders to Sherman.

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH

AN EDITORIAL BY JAMES H. DUMKE

PART ONE

Shiloh was the first major battle in the civil war that pointed to the destruction and slaughter that was to come. Yes, there was the battle of First Bull Run, but that fight was more like two mobs going at it and the casualties were minuscule compared to what was to come over the next four

years. Shiloh was important, not just as a harbinger of the cost of the war in lives, but it was also the first major victory for Union arms during the war. It boosted Union morale and dispirited Southerners as well. Two other significant matters resulting from the battle were the death of General Albert Sydney Johnston and the continued rise of General Grant.

This year is the 155th anniversary of the battle and it is the Association's national event in 2017. Therefore it is appropriate to take a look at the battle and its importance in this month's editorial.

If one took a look at the strategic situation in the West at the beginning of 1862, the primary focus would have been on the rivers that intersected the land mass. The Tennessee, Cumberland, and Mississippi Rivers provided the rapidly expanding Union navy and infantry avenues to move deep into Southern territory. The Confederates lacked the industrial and material capacity to build a countervailing naval force, thus giving almost total control on the rivers to the Union forces. Thus the Confederates were required to rely on strong forts at strategic locations on the rivers to restrict Federal advances deep into rebel territory. This presented a strategic dilemma for the rebels in the Western Theater. General Johnston was holding a defensive line that ran from Columbus through Bowling Green (the center of his line) to the Cumberland Gap. The understanding of the strategic situation and the relationship of events between the capture of Fort Henry, the Battle of Shiloh, and the eventual occupation of Corinth can best be understood when viewed as a coherent campaign pressed by the National army. A good description of the strategic circumstances could be described as:

**"Tennessee was twice divided: first by the Tennessee River, and then by the Cumberland, both of which invited the advance of a hostile force. Some small pretense of fortifications had been made on both rivers at Forts Henry and Donelson, near the boundary line, but practically there was nothing to prevent the Federal army from capturing Nashville, then the most important depot of supplies west of the Alleghenies. Hence the immediate and pressing question for General Johnston was the defense of the Tennessee border."
(Johnston, 543)**

The Confederate forces under Johnston were spread out on a long defensive line. On the rebel left were the Forts Henry and Donelson. The Confederate center was located in Bowling Green and the right in eastern

Tennessee. The primary focus for Johnston was to protect the Tennessee border from Union incursion and to maintain the rebel hold on Nashville, an important center for railroad connections, supplies, and materials.

General Johnston worried that the Union forces would move down the rivers and invade deeply into Southern territory. If the Union troops were successful in capturing the forts on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers they could separate the rebel armies on the Mississippi River and those under Johnston in Tennessee. Not only that, but with his own forces spread out over a very long defensive line his army was subject to defeat in detail by Federal troops. Johnston faced General Buell who had 30,000 troops and General Grant's 40,000 soldiers. Johnston's scattered forces amounted to roughly 20,000 men of all arms. To avoid this threat he had to withdraw from Central Tennessee or the line along the Mississippi River. He decided to sacrifice Central Tennessee, but he also had to protect the railroads in his theater so he decided to concentrate in the area of Corinth and Humboldt, where a number of the rebel railroads conjoined. (Force, p. 107)

As Johnston worried, Union commanders were already laying the ground work for a combined army-navy operation aimed at attacking Forts Henry and Donelson. General U. S. Grant was trying to convince the Department of Missouri Commander, Henry Halleck, to approve the venture. General Halleck was slow to approve the plan to create a combined army and navy operation down the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. Eventually, however, Halleck did approve a move on Fort Henry under Grant's command.

General P. G. T. Beauregard argued that the Confederate army should concentrate at Fort Henry or Donelson and make a concerted effort to destroy Grant's army at that point. However, General A. S. Johnston, the commander-in-chief of the rebel armies, disagreed. General Johnston did not believe it was sound military principle and there wasn't sufficient time to concentrate forces at Fort Donelson. The following was written by William Johnston, Albert Sidney Johnston's son, and a Colonel in the Confederate army. It is indeed intended to justify the decisions by his father. William Johnston does, however, make some good points in the undermining of the arguments of his chief foil, P. G. T. Beauregard. Johnston writes:

The proposition that he [General Johnston] should have left Nashville open to capture by Buell, and should have taken all his

troops to Donelson, could not have been seriously considered by any general of even moderate military capacity. General Beauregard alleges that he urged General Johnston to concentrate all his available forces and attack Grant at Fort Donelson. Conclusive contemporary evidence demonstrates that General Beauregard's memory is at fault. But, this aside, no more fatal plan of campaign could have been proposed. Such a concentration was impracticable within the limits of the time required for success. The Confederates would have been met by a superior force under General Grant, whose position, flanked by the batteries of Fort Henry, covered by gunboats, and to be approached only over causeways not then constructed, was absolutely impregnable. It requires an utter disregard of facts seriously to consider such a project. Moreover, this movement would have been an abandonment to Buell of Nashville, the objective point of the Federal campaign. And, finally, this desperate project, commended by General Beauregard, was exactly what the Union generals were striving, hoping, planning to compel General Johnston to do. The answer to any criticism as to the loss of the army at Donelson is that *it ought not to have been lost.* [Emphasis in the original] That is all there is of it. (Johnston, 548)

General Beauregard obviously disagreed with the conclusion of the commanding general, A. S. Johnston. Beauregard would point to the unfortunate consequences of the fall of both Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in defense of his view that troops should have been concentrated in front of Grant to destroy him before he could invade deep into Southern territory and before he could join with General Buell to concentrate his forces. Beauregard wrote:

The failure to employ opportunely all possible available resources against General Grant, and the consequent loss of Donelson, with its invaluable garrison, carried immediately in its train the irrevocable loss of Nashville also, with the early abandonment of Middle Tennessee. Another irrevocable consequence was the evacuation of Columbus, with incalculable moral detriments.” (Beauregard, p. 572)

While the navy was able to pound Fort Henry into submission before Grant needed to attack with his troops, thus resulting in a successful effort without the risk of battle. However, most of the troops in Fort Henry were marched away to Fort Donelson to swell the number of troops at that fort. Fort Henry fell on February 5th, 1862. After organizing his troops and

securing the fort, Grant turned his attention on Fort Donelson. It took Grant awhile to get his troops transported and marched to the environs of Fort Donelson. The weather was miserable making the march slow and difficult. The navy moved into position to bombard the fort. The navy was unable to accomplish the same result they had achieved at Fort Henry. Damaged and driven away from the fort, the navy withdrew to lick their wounds and repair their damaged boats. Meanwhile, Grant invested the fort with his troops. The rebels did try to break out and attacked Grant's forces. During the fighting, the Confederates did open a road out of Fort Donelson, but for some inexplicable reason General Floyd ordered his troops to withdraw back into the confines of the fort and their rifle pits. General Forrest did lead his cavalry out and escaped the tightening noose put in place by Grant. About 4,000 infantry and Floyd were also able to escape the fort before Buckner was forced to surrender the garrison.

When Simon Buckner surrendered the fort Grant captured between 13,000 and 15,000 rebel troops. While the blame for the loss of the fort and the large number of troops should have fallen on General Floyd, a large share of the blame was heaped on the general commanding, General Johnston. Politicians, editors, and the soldiers had lost faith in Johnston's leadership. Over and above the blame for the disaster, the fall of Fort Donelson was an unmitigated disaster for the Western Theater and the control of Tennessee and Kentucky.

FORT DONELSON WAS NOT just a defeat, it was a catastrophe. The loss of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers meant that the Federals had penetrated deep into the Southern interior. In two weeks, Johnston had fallen back a hundred miles, Nashville had been abandoned, and the forts along the Mississippi appeared doomed. A Union army and a formidable river separated the corps of Polk and Hardee. Most significantly, at least 15,000 prisoners had been taken, about one-third of Johnston's forces east of the Mississippi River. Because of the policy of prisoner exchange, most of these regiments would be back in service again within seven months. The troops were not available when they were needed most, however—the first day at Shiloh. Whether an additional corps would have made a decisive difference in the first day's battle can only be left to speculation, but it undoubtedly would have had a considerable effect.” (Daniel, p. 29)

The disaster was not just the loss of thousands of troops from the Rebel army. The surrender of Fort Donelson made the defensive line in Kentucky and Tennessee untenable.

Realizing that the Kentucky-Tennessee line could no longer be held, General Johnston decided to withdraw all Confederate forces south of the Cumberland River. Fort Donelson, Bowling Green, and Columbus were to be evacuated; and if it proved impossible to organize adequate defensive works at Nashville, then even that prime center was to be abandoned. The two separate wings of the Confederate forces in Kentucky were to operate independently under General Polk and Hardee until they could be united at some undetermined spot southward. The eastern portion was to fall back on Nashville and if necessary to take the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad to Stevenson, Alabama. The western force was to withdraw to Humboldt, Tennessee, and then to Grand Junction in order to cover Memphis. Confederate naval forces, under George N. Hollins, were to cooperate in a series of rear guard actions at Columbus, Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, and at Memphis if necessary.” (Cunningham, p. 54)

In essence Grant had turned the left flank of Johnston’s defensive line and compelled him ultimately to withdraw from Nashville. During the withdrawal Johnston found the Tennessee River controlled by the U.S. fleet and armies separating Johnston from Beauregard whose troops were guarding the Mississippi River and its environs. (Force, p. 107) Beauregard and Johnston seem to have simultaneously determined that the soldiers from both armies be concentrated in and around Corinth, Mississippi. One reason for this was the advantage of a number of railroads coming into that area enhancing the ability to provide supplies and move troops. It was also necessary to try to protect those railroads from Union interference and destruction, if possible. Johnston’s strategic plan was to:

General Johnston’s plan of campaign may be summed up in a phrase, was to concentrate at Corinth and interpose his whole force in front of the great bend of the Tennessee [River], the natural base of the Federal army: this effected, to crush Grant in battle before the arrival of Buell. This meant immediate and decisive action. (Johnston, p. 550)

General Beauregard, as indicated, also took credit for the decision to concentrate rebel forces in the Corinth area. Beauregard did not necessarily see this move as an effort to destroy Grant's army as he write in one of his post-war articles:

I thus fixed upon Corinth as the Confederate base, because the recent movements of our enemy up the Tennessee could only be intelligently construed as having the Memphis and Charleston railroad primarily, and such a railway center as Corinth later, as their immediate objectives. (Beauregard, p. 575)

Both Generals Beauregard and Johnston agreed that Grant must be attacked and defeated before he could form a junction with the troops from Buell's army. It seemed imperative that the drive by National forces into the Southern heartland had to be reversed. The theory of concentration of forces was a long held maxim for military tactics.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCENTRATION of force is one of the oldest in military history. General Johnston had been forced to violate this principle in attempting to defend southern Kentucky and Tennessee, but after the fall of Fort Donelson the Southern high command rapidly began moving toward the idea of massing all available forces for one showdown attack to save the Mississippi Valley. It is impossible to say who first conceived of the idea of an all out concentration onto one army in the region, but as early as February 15, Major General Braxton Bragg, writing from Mobile, Alabama, suggested to the Richmond authorities that the time had come to mass all that the South had for the struggle. (Cunningham, p. 91)

Every effort was exerted to gather all available Confederate troops for the coming battle. General Bragg brought his command from Pensacola and Mobile. Troops were summoned from Louisiana, as was Van Dorn from Arkansas. General Beauregard takes credit once again for the concentration of troops at Corinth. He describes this decision, and its implications, in his own words as follows:

With a view to avoiding such a catastrophe as the enforced permanent separation of our two armies, I urged General Johnston, about the 22^d of February, to abandon his line of march towards Stevenson, and to hasten to unite his army with such troops as I might

be able to assemble, meanwhile, at the best point to cover the railroad center at Corinth together with Memphis, while holding Island Number Ten and Fort Pillow. This plan, of course, required more troops than our united armies would supply.” (Beauregard, p. 574)

General Johnston began withdrawing his forces from Central Tennessee. According to the author Force Johnston initially moved to Murfreesboro with the intent of deceiving the Union commanders as to his intended strategic decisions.

Taking an indirect route to concentrate his forces Johnston marched to Murfreesboro where he added 4,000 troops who had escaped from Fort Donelson. Johnston arrived in Corinth on March 24th with 20,000 men. (Force, p. 108)

“Preceding Johnston’s arrival Polk and Cheatam arrived in Corinth from Columbus, as well as troops who had escaped from Island No. 10 before any avenue for escape was cut off.” And: “General Bragg later arrives with 10,000 well trained troops.” Also troops from: “Outlying garrisons under Beauregard also were coming in to Corinth.” Finally: “Ruggles brings in troops from New Orleans.” (Force, p. 108)

Meanwhile, Grant began moving his army south on the Tennessee River. His focus seemed to be breaking up the rail links that ran south into Corinth, Mississippi. It also continued the drive into the Confederate heartland and contribute to the final defeat of the rebellion. General Grant had assembled a fleet of boats to transport his army down the Tennessee River. It appears C. F. Smith, who was commanding general for a time after a dispute created by Halleck. Halleck accused Grant of failing to keep him informed of his status and activity in Tennessee. The matter was eventually resolved and Grant was returned to command of the Army of the Tennessee. It was really a tempest in a teapot. The author, Larry Daniels blames the lack of communication on a rebel sympathizer in the telegrapher’s office, but the decision to strip Grant of his command may have been motivated to a degree by the jealousy of General Halleck in regards to his subordinate.

Smith had selected Savannah as the headquarters for the army. However, General Sherman liked the Pittsburg Landing location to encamp

the army. The location provided excellent defensive opportunities because of the topography and the area was excellent as a camp site with plenty of water and woods for shelter. Thus as the troops arrived they were disembarked at Pittsburg Landing.

Grant had reorganized his army into six divisions with 43,000 soldiers of all arms and sent them down the river to engage in destructive raids and eventually to meet the rebels in combat.

Five Federal divisions (reinforced a few days later) has reached Savannah, twelve miles below Pittsburg Landing, on the east bank of the Tennessee, by the 13th of March. This force, aggregating some 43,000 men of all arms, was under the direct command of General C. F. Smith, and embraced the greater part of the army that had triumphed at Donelson. One division, without landing at Savannah, was dispatched, under General W. T. Sherman, to endeavor to land, and to reach and cut some trestle-work near Burnsville, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Effecting a landing, short, however, of Eastport, the intervening country was found so inundated as to be seemingly impracticable. So, this expedition, hardly characterized by a really vigorous effort to reach the railroad, was abortive—a result aided somewhat by the opportune presence on the ground of Brigadier-General Chalmers with a Confederate force of 2500 infantry. (Beauregard, p. 576)

The divisions, as they arrived at Pittsburg Landing, were nearly complete in their organization, but the Sixth Division was still being organized.

Of the five divisions at Pittsburg Landing the organization of Four—the First, McClelland's; Second C. F. Smith's, commanded by Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, General Smith being ill at Savannah; the Fourth, Hurlbut's; and the Fifth, Sherman's—was completed. The Sixth, commanded by Prentiss, was still in the process of formation. (Force, p. 113)

So the two armies concentrated their forces, the Confederates in Corinth and the National troops at Pittsburg Landing, about twenty-five miles apart. It is probably germane to take a look at these armies as they prepared to engage in battle.

One of the problems in the rebel armies was both a lack of weapons and a wide discrepancy in the weapons carried by the soldiers. Another problem, experienced by the National and rebel armies, was a lack of experienced and trained military leaders. This would be a problem that would haunt all commands in both armies until much later in the war.

If there were inadequacies in most of the Confederate soldiers' shoulder arms, this was at least slightly compensated for in the wide variety of side arms carried even by the enlisted men. Most of the officers and noncoms carried revolvers, and many of the former carried swords, and almost everyone from private to general seems to have carried some kind of knife, whether a simple Bowie or a more sophisticated Arkansas toothpick. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of enlisted men carried revolvers or some sort of pistol stuffed in their pockets or in the waistbands of their pants.

As bad as the weapon situation was in the Confederate army, the standards of training were generally even worse, excepting General Bragg's soldiers. The chief of staff described Generals Polk and Breckenridge's soldiers as a "heterogeneous mass in which there was more enthusiasm than discipline, more capacity than knowledge, and more valor than instructions." One of Bragg's biggest problems in trying to discipline the army lay in the lack of trained officers. Most of the senior officers were either professionals or experienced amateurs, but at the company and regimental level the bulk of officers were ex-civilians. A very few regiments had trained senior officers. (Cunningham, pps. 100-01)

Supply issues were not a major problem for the Federal troops and they settled into their camps and adjusted to their role as soldiers. The Federal troops were well armed and well supplied.

On their off duty time the Union soldiers sat under trees or inside their tents playing euchre, sledge, poker, and for the more intellectual minded, whist or reading, with the rain pattering the roofs of tents. When the weather permitted, or the soldiers simply decided to go outside anyway, there were interminable ball games in addition to running, jumping, and wrestling matches for the more strenuous minded.

The food was fair, at least for those units blessed with competent cooks. One cavalry battalion boasted of its fine coffee and biscuits, but other units suffered from stomach ailments caused by inexperienced cooks. The Twenty-fifth Indiana Infantry dined on fried potatoes, meat, hash, rice, beans, hominy, pies, and biscuits. For the soldiers with an extra sweet tooth it was only necessary to visit one of the numerous sutlers camped about near the Landing who sold fruits, preserves, jelly, catsup, apple butter, and perhaps a host of other delicacies, and occasionally an unofficial shot of bad whiskey.” (Cunningham, p. 113)

If there was a problem among the Union forces it was a sense of overconfidence bred by success after success. From Belmont, Missouri, through the fall of Fort Donelson; Grant’s soldiers had know nothing but success and they expected that they would finally crush the rebels when they next met. The Union troops believed that the rebels were severely demoralized by their setbacks and would not take the offensive against their highly successful armies in the field. One of the criticisms of Grant and Sherman that arose after the battle was that the Union army had not entrenched or stood on the defensive at Pittsburg Landing. One reason that the National forces were not prepared for an attack was that overconfidence that their demoralized enemy would be unable to generate the enthusiasm for such an offensive effort.

Just three hours horseback ride away, General U. S. Grant’s army was also undergoing a few problems. The single biggest thing wrong with the Union army was a malady which all the men from private to general were suffering—overconfidence. On March 29, Grant wrote his beloved wife, Julia, that “a big fight may be looked for some place before a great while which it appears to me will be the last in the West.” He went on to say that he was completely confident of success. Three days later Grant’s youngest divisional commander, Brigadier General Lew Wallace, wrote an old friend that the rebellion “is closing fast,” and continuing, Wallace predicted that the Union army would have complete control of the Mississippi River before the end of April. (Cunningham, p. 105)

While the Union troops whiled away their time at Pittsburg Landing and engaged in drill to sharpen their soldierly skills, the rebels were

planning and organizing an attack in force on their enemy twenty-five miles away. It was a move the Union soldiers and officers did not expect!

The general commanding, A. S. Johnston, had adopted a deferential attitude towards General Beauregard and gave him wide latitude in making arrangements for the disposition and location of the armies arriving in Corinth. A controversy which developed after the battle was an assertion that Beauregard had changed the plan of attack envisioned by Johnston. Johnston's son argues that his father had intended the attack to be made by columns of corps, but Beauregard determined to attack using three parallel lines. It will become apparent as this article develops that the result of using three parallel lines in the attack was confusion and a comingling of commands blunting the impact of the assaults on the Union lines.

General Beauregard had been on the ground some six weeks, and his prestige as an engineer and a victor of Bull Run warranted General Johnston in committing to him the elaboration of details of the march and order of battle. Unfortunately he changed what seems evidently General Johnston's original purpose of an assault by columns of corps into an array in three parallel lines of battle, which produced extreme confusion when the second and third lines advanced to support the first and intermingled with it. Johnston's original plan is summed up on the following dispatch to President Davis:

CORINTH, April 3d, 1862. General Buell in motion thirty thousand strong, Mitchel behind him with ten thousand. Confederate forces—forty thousand—ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg. Division from Bethel, main body from Corinth, reserve from Burnsville, converging tomorrow near Monterey on Pittsburg. Beauregard second in command, Polk the left, Bragg the center, Hardee the left wing, Breckenridge the reserve. *Hope engagement before Buell can form junction.* [Italics in the original] (Johnston, pps. 552-53)

General Johnston was determined to attack and destroy Grant's army before Buell could arrive to reinforce Grant. As March came to a close the two armies in the area of Pittsburg Landing were nearly equal in size. Buell had 40,000 troops under his command and if the armies of the Federals were joined it would be a disaster for the Confederate army. Johnston had gathered nearly all available soldiers (except Van Dorn's command which Johnston hoped would reach Corinth before his proposed attack) and it was not likely that Johnston could amass an army nearly as large as the combined Union forces.

It is clear that General Johnston was planning on the element of surprise in the upcoming campaign. In that vein Johnston would put his forces on the march beginning on April 3rd, 1862. The roads leading to the Landing were not good and there were only two roads on which the troops could move. From the outset there were problems. First, there were snarls that impeded the progress of the army. Second, torrential rain came down and mired the army in mud on roads that were not good to begin with. Wagons and artillery bogged down seriously in the mud. Third, General Johnston had ordered that the troops prepare five days rations for the coming campaign. Some of the soldiers received the orders too late to prepare more than three days rations. As in all armies, however, the soldiers ate their rations early on and were short rations as the campaign drew to a conclusion. As a result of the delays on the march the soldiers would be hungry during the battle and afterwards. Lastly, as the lead elements of the rebel army neared the Landing they would become engaged in firefights with the National troops' pickets and cavalry scouting the area. The rebels had also been firing their rifles to determine if their wet powder would function in the coming battle. These problems made Johnston's plan to attack on April 5th impracticable because all the troops were not yet up and ready to fight.

The order was to attack at 3 o'clock on the morning of Saturday, April 5th; but the troops were not in position until late that afternoon. All day Friday the advancing columns had pushed on over the tangled, miry roads, hindered and embarrassed by a pelting rain. After midnight a violent storm broke upon them as they stood under arms in the pitch darkness, with no shelter but the trees. From detention by the rain, ignorance of the roads, and a confusion produced by the order of march, some divisions failed to get into line, and the day was wasted. (Johnston, p. 555)

Thus with the rebel armies not in position, there was not chance for the battle to begin on Saturday, April 5th, as ordered.

There was no possibility for an offensive on Saturday. To attack with only part of the army that was deployed was to invite disaster. Indeed it was increasingly becoming a moot question if the army should attack at all. The success of the Confederate plan depended in large part on achieving at least strategic surprise over General Grant. If the Federals were alerted and massed behind fortifications at Pittsburg, then the Southern chances for victory were practically nil.

After three days of troop movements in the field, it was quite possible that the Federals were on alert. Even more serious was the danger that General Grant's soldiers had heard the Confederates firing their guns off and yelling. The most dangerous possibility of them all however, was that the Union army had been tipped off by the increasingly heavy skirmishing near the Federal camp. (Cunningham, pps. 128-29)

In fact, the behavior of the troops and the increasing contacts between the leading elements of both armies lead to concerns that the element of surprise had been compromised, making any attack a dangerous endeavor. General Beauregard counseled calling off the attack and withdrawing back to the Confederate base at Corinth. O. Edward Cunningham described the situation as follows:

The Creole wished to cancel the attack and return to Corinth, Bragg joined in with the Louisianan, claiming the two day's delay, added to the poor condition of many of the troops, were too great handicaps to be overcome by an assault now. There were some questions as to the size of the Federal force. Colonel Thomas Jordan maintained it numbered less than twenty-five thousand men and twelve batteries. Other officers added comments about the situation, but General Johnston ended all discussions. Maintaining that the Federals were probably unsuspecting, he stated it would be far worse to turn back without fighting than to risk a battle. After the recent disasters in Kentucky and Tennessee, the army must recoup the situation. He added, "We shall attack at daylight tomorrow" and as he walked off, he remarked, "I would fight them if they were a million". (Cunningham, p. 138)

The following quotation comes from Beauregard, himself, and sets out his view of the circumstances as they existed immediately prior to initiating the assault on the Union forces at Pittsburg Landing. Beauregard's writing was created years after the war, but it seems pretty clear that Beauregard's concerns were real and based on the situation on the ground as the rebels prepared to attack Grant's army.

Of course, it was recognized to be too late for an attack that day. Moreover, it was reported that the First Corps was already nearly out of provisions and that the ammunition train was still so far to the rear as to be unpromising. The loss of twenty-four hours, when every hour

was precious because of the imminent danger of Buell's conjunction, the maladroit manner in which our troops had been handled on the march, and the blunder of the noisy, offensive reconnaissance, coupled with these reports of corps commanders, served to satisfy me that the purpose for which we had left Corinth had been essentially frustrated and should be abandoned as no longer feasible. The military essence of our projected operation was that it should be a surprise, whereas, now, I could not believe the enemy was still ignorant of our near presence with an aggressive intention, and if now attacked would be found intrenched beyond the possibility of being beaten in assault by so raw and undisciplined an army as ours was, however intrepid. Hence, an imperative prudence that included the necessity for preserving that army essentially intact for further operations forced me to advise against any attempt now to attack the enemy in position and to retrace our steps toward our base with the possible result of leading him to follow us away from his own and thus giving us a probable opening to the retrievable of the present lost opportunity.

General Johnston listened heedfully to what I said, but answered that he hoped not only should we find our enemy still unready for a sudden onslaught, but there was yet time for it before Buell could come up; therefore, he should decide to adventure the enterprise as early as dawn the next day as possible, adding his opinion that now our troops were partly in line of battle it were "better to make the venture." The opinion of the corps commanders, I may add, were neither asked nor given. That my views were based on sound military principles it seems to me could readily be deduced from what followed at the battle of Shiloh itself, were this the place for such a discussion. (Beauregard, p. 583)

The Confederate troops waited for their attack and tried to prepare themselves for the conflict that would come early the next morning. It was an uncomfortable night for the rebel soldiers. Although there were the usual concerns of soldiers readying for battle, it seems fair to say no one expected the bloodletting that was about to erupt on the morning of Sunday, April 6th, 1862.

Strictly forbidden to light fires or make any kind of noise, forty thousand Confederate soldiers squatted, knelt, or laid down in the slick slime covering the entire area, talking quietly over General Johnston's message and mulling over Sunday's prospects. Some of the

soldiers munched cold rations, but most of them went hungry. The rain had stopped during the afternoon, but most of the Confederates were still at least damp, and thick, slick brown Tennessee mud covered everything. As the soldiers tried to clean their muskets and shotguns, perhaps some of them remembered General Beauregard's order to shoot low at the enemy's legs to cause wounded men, who would have to be carried off the battlefield. It was a cheerful thought for the men to try and catch a little sleep with. (Cunningham, p. 141)

Despite the possible negative ramifications of the campaign as it had developed, the Confederate leaders remained optimistic about the outcome of the attack set for Sunday morning. It does appear that Beauregard, at least, understood the desperate struggle to come.

All of the senior officers in the Confederate army were still confident of victory, although General Beauregard did express one foreboding thought. He remarked, "In the struggle tomorrow we shall be fighting men of our own blood, Western men, who understand the use of firearms. The struggle will be a desperate one". (Cunningham, p. 125)

Despite the concern of the rebel commanders about the loss of the element of surprise, on the Union side of the equation there was little thought that the army at Pittsburg Landing was in any danger from their adversaries who were supposed to be still in Corinth. After the battle both Grant and Sherman came under criticism for the failure to prepare for a possible attack by the rebels. Grant had felt it was more important to drill the army than to entrench or focus on other defensive efforts. It seems clear that Sherman did not apprehend an aggressive move by the Confederates based on his dispatches to Grant on Saturday, April 5th.

"All is quiet along my line now. We are in the act of exchanging cavalry, according to your orders. The enemy has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery about six miles out. I will send you in ten prisoners of war and a report of last night's affair, in a few minutes.

"Your note is just received. I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day, more than some picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will

not be drawn out far, unless with certainty of advantage; and I do not apprehend anything like an attack upon our position. (Force, p. 119)

Later in the day Sherman sent another dispatch to Grant: “I infer that the enemy is in some considerable force at Pea Ridge [another name for Monterey]; that yesterday they crossed a bridge with two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery of field artillery, to the ridge on which the Corinth road lays. They halted the infantry and artillery about five miles in my front, and sent a detachment out to the house of General Meeks, on the north of Owl Creek, and the cavalry down toward our camp. This cavalry captured a part of our advance pickets, and afterward engaged two companies of Colonel Buckland’s regiment, as described by him in his report herewith enclosed. Our cavalry drive them back upon their artillery and infantry, killing many and bringing ten prisoners (all of the First Alabama Cavalry), whom I send you.” (Force, p. 119-120)

There was evidence of a buildup of rebel troops in the area of Pittsburg Landing. Reports came in of desperate exchanges between Union cavalry and pickets with rebels whom seemed to be in large numbers on the field. It is clear, however, based on Sherman’s dispatches set out above, that he did not see any danger for the army and did not anticipate an attack.

On Sunday morning, beginning at around 3:00 a.m. the rebel troops began forming up for the assault on the enemy. The time had come. Johnston’s troops were arrayed for the coming struggle.

General Johnston’s strategy was completed. He was face to face with his foe, and that foe all unaware of his coming. His front line, composed of the Third Corps and Gladden’s brigade, was under Hardee, and extended from Owl Creek to Lick Creek, more than three miles. Hindman’s division of two brigades occupied the center, Cleburne’s brigade had the left, and Gladden’s the right wing—an effective total in the front line of 9024. The second line was commanded by Bragg. He had two divisions: Wither’s, of two brigades, on the right, and Ruggle’s, of three brigades on the left. The brigades were in order from right to left, as follows: Chalmers, Jackson, Gibson, Anderson, Pond. This second line was 10,731 strong. The third line, or reserve, was composed of the First Corps, under Polk, and three brigades under Breckenridge. Polk’s command was massed in columns of brigades on the Bark road near Mickey’s,

and Breckenridge on the road from Monterey toward the same point. Polk was to advance on the left of Bark road, at an interval of about eight hundred paces from Bragg's line; and Breckenridge, to the right of that road, was to give support wherever it should become necessary. Polk's Corps, 9136 strong in infantry and artillery, was composed of two divisions: Cheatham's on the left, made up of Bushrod R. Johnson's and Stephen's brigades, and Clark's on his right, formed of A. P. Stewart's and Russell's brigade. It followed Bragg's line at a distance of about eight hundred yards. Breckenridge's reserve was composed of Trabue's, Bowen's, and Stratham's brigades, with a total infantry and artillery, of 6439. The cavalry, about 4300 strong, guarded the flanks or was detached on outpost duty; but both from newness and imperfection of their organization, equipment, and drill, and from the rough and wooded character of the ground, they could do little service that day. The effectives of all arms that marched out to battle were about 39,630, or exclusive of cavalry, 35,330.

The Federal army numbered 49,232, and present for duty 41,543. But at Crump's Landing, five or six miles distant, was General Lew Wallace's division with 8820 present, and 7771 men present for duty. General Nelson's division of Buell's army had arrived at Savannah on Saturday morning, and was now about five miles distant; Crittenden's division also had arrived on the morning of the 6th. So that Grant, with these three divisions, may be considered as having about 22,000 men in immediate reserve, without counting the remainder of Buell's army, which was near by.

As General Johnston and his staff were taking their coffee, the first gun of the battle sounded. "Note the hour, if you please, gentlemen," said General Johnston. It was fourteen minutes past 5. They immediately mounted and galloped to the front." (Johnston, pps. 557-58)

Thus at shortly after 5:00 a.m. the attack was launched. Union troops were in varying circumstances when the first wave of rebel troops hit them. Some were just settling in for their breakfast, others were in their ranks for roll call. But some were geared up and preparing to move into line of battle for a reconnaissance in force or because they heard the unmistakable increase in firing that suggested something more than a skirmish between picketing troops. The initial wave of rebels ran into a Missouri regiment whose colonel had moved the regiment out to determine what was on his

front. He had heard voices and the sounds of equipment for what seemed like a large body of troops. The Twenty-fifth Missouri soon found itself hotly engaged. The sound of the fighting alerted troops in the immediate area and they were preparing for a possible attack. The Missouri troops slowly fell back onto the Union line while fighting with the onrushing rebels. Many of the Union troops were surprised but they responded quickly and soon had formed line of battle to face their rapidly advancing foe!

To appreciate the suddenness and violence of the blow, one must read the testimony of eye-witnesses. General Bragg says, in a sketch of Shiloh made for the writer: "Contrary to the views if such as urged an abandonment of the attack [as proposed by Beauregard], the enemy was found utterly unprepared, many being surprised and captured in their tents, and others, though on the outside, in costumes better fitted to the bedchamber than the battlefield." General Preston says: "General Johnston then went to the camp assailed, which was carried between 7 and 8 o'clock. The enemy were evidently surprised. The breakfasts were on the mess tables, the baggage unpacked, the knapsacks, stores, colors, and ammunition abandoned." (Johnston, pps. 558-59)

The initial push by the Confederate troops met with some success. It took a bit of time for Union forces to establish their lines and develop effective resistance. The effectiveness of Union troops was inconsistent. In some places they drove back the rebel attackers while in other sectors the Union lines disintegrated, and troops retreated in disorder towards the river. In other areas officers were able to halt the route and reform their lines to continue the fight.

The corps were not assigned a specific section of the Union line to shatter. Instead, Hardee and Bragg were to advance in parallel lines, stretching across a front three miles wide. This was a faulty arrangement, since it would make for confusion when the units became entangled as the battle progressed. In General Johnston's telegram to President Jefferson Davis informing him of the forthcoming battle, nothing was said about this parallel formation. Instead, the order of attack was given as Polk on the left, Hardee in the center, Bragg on the right, and Breckenridge in reserve. This plan would have much more efficient and it would have probably weighted the Confederate right so as to make more likely the Confederate plan of securing the Landing." (Cunningham, 139-40)

On the Confederate side the troops not only were facing determined resistance in some sectors, but thick trees and brush broke up their lines as they advanced. Had the rebels attacked as planned in columns of corps they could have focused their force much more effectively, but the three parallel lines soon became entangled and the force was diluted and spread out. This gave Union troops the opportunity to organize effective resistance along their defensive lines.

The Union flanks were driven back, slowly but consistently, but in the center the regiments under General Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace, along a sunken road which provided some protection for the troops, began an hours long defense that the rebels could not break. There was thick underbrush in front of the men of Wallace's and Prentiss' command which disrupted the lines of the rebel soldiers making their attacks disjointed and ineffective.

William Johnston believes that the Union forces were close to being destroyed. There is no doubt that the rebel forces were making progress, but there was stubborn resistance all along the Union lines. At 2:30 p.m. Albert Sidney Johnston suffered a wound that would prove fatal. William Johnston saw the strategic situation as:

Up to the moment of the death of the commander-in-chief, in spite of the dislocation of the commands, there was the most perfect regularity in the development of the plan of battle. On all the seeming confusion there was the predominance of intelligent design; a master mind, keeping in clear view its purpose, sought the weak point in the defense, and, by massing his troops upon the enemy's left, kept turning that flank. With the disadvantage of inferior numbers, General Johnston brought to bear a superior force on each particular point, and, by a series of rapid and powerful blows, broke the Federal army to pieces. (Johnston, p. 565)

There is no doubt the Union troops were under a great deal of pressure. But the center was holding and as the National forces retreated the advantage was the concentration of force as the lines were compacted by retreat and reformation. It should also be noted that the withdrawal of Federal troops was slow and a fighting retreat, although some units broke and ran. Union troops would fall back, reorganize, fight, and withdraw once again a few hundred yards and then turn and fight once more.

The loss of General Johnston would impact the overall fight, so it is worth a small digression to look at the circumstances of the fatal wounding of the general. The biggest impact is that the death of General Johnston left General Beauregard in overall command of Confederate forces.

Just before the fatal incident, the Confederate commander spoke to Governor Harris, and Johnston showed him where a musket ball had torn his shoe. A concerned Harris asked, "Are you wounded? Did the ball touch your foot?" The general simply replied in the negative and told Harris to carry an order to Colonel Statham. One of General Johnston's aides, Captain Leigh Wickham, remained with the general while Harris was on his errand. A few minutes later, Wickham heard the thud of a slug striking an object. Seconds later, he noticed blood dripping down General Johnston's leg, and remarked to the general about it. But the commander seemed unconcerned. Colonel Theodore O'Hara, the famed Southern poet and adventurer, rode up at this time and observed the blood. The author of *The Bivouac of the Dead* turned around and galloped for a surgeon.

His mission fulfilled, the Tennessee governor was back at the side of his friend within a few minutes. Before Harris could report, General Johnston reeled in his saddle. The governor grabbed him with his left hand, helping to support him in the saddle. Harris asked the general if he was hurt. Very softly Johnston replied, "Yes, and I fear seriously." Governor Harris asked Wickham to go for a doctor. Supporting Johnston with one hand, the Tennessean led their horses to a sheltered spot a short distance away. Gently pulling the wounded general off his horse, Harris placed him on the ground and began searching his body for some other wound more serious than the seemingly minor one in his right leg.

William Preston and other staff officers collected around the bleeding general, who died perhaps twenty minutes after the wound was inflicted. There was little, if any, suffering. General Johnston simply lapsed into unconsciousness and died in this condition about 2:30 p.m. (Cunningham, pps. 275-76)

The primary problem for the Confederates was the Union center. The rebels could not simply move around them as it would expose their flanks to Union fire. The fight at what became known as the Hornet's Nest or the Sunken Road would continue until around 5:30 p.m. As the Union left and

right were pushed back, the center under Prentiss and Wallace became exposed and rebel troops began to encircle the center.

When Prentiss and Sherman were attacked, there was a wide gap between their lines. A little after ten o'clock the National line was connected, Sherman on the right, McClellan next, on his left, Prentiss, and Hurlbut and McArthur filling the space between Prentiss and Stuart. The right was gradually forced back on a curve till, at half-past four o'clock, there was a gap between McClellan and Wallace. Hurlbut held his ground till four o'clock, but by half-past four he retreated, leaving Prentiss' left in air. Through the two gaps thus made the Confederate left and right poured in and encircled Prentiss and Wallace. After their surrender there was no fighting, except Chalmer's bold but idle attack.

In this day's battle the National loss was nearly ten thousand killed, wounded, and captured. The Confederate loss was as great in killed and wounded, but the loss in prisoners was small." (Force, Pps. 158-59)

At around 5:30 p.m. Wallace saw that he had to withdraw his men or face destruction or capture. As Wallace was leading his troops from the Hornet's Nest he suffered a mortal head wound. Prentiss saw the same situation and he surrendered his 2,000 soldiers. The following quotation reflects this situation from the eyes of an Ohio soldier.

The comparatively even battle lines of the Shiloh Church and Purdy Road positions were now only a fond memory to the harassed Union commanders. The Federal line, if such it could be called, straggled over Jones' Field and the surrounding hills and ravines. Confederate and Union skirmishers were badly intermixed, and there was heavy musketry over all the area. One unidentified Ohio soldier, when wounded and ordered to the rear, wandered back within a few minutes and most aptly summed up the situation in a plea to his company commander, "Cap, give me a gun. This blamed fight ain't got any rear". (Cunningham, p. 279)

The Confederate lines were terribly intermingled and elements of their armies were driven from the field and were just wandering around or ransacking the abandoned Union camps looking for food and souvenirs. Officers were separated from their regiments or brigades. Some officers

were trying to organize broken rebel units into an effective fighting force, with indifferent success. Other officers who had been separated from their units were trying to locate them behind the lines.

Still, the rebel forces had had much success. Beginning around 5:30 p.m., as the Union center was broken and rebel troops were rounding up Union prisoners, Grant was busy fashioning a makeshift defensive line with a compact line of artillery that slowed the rebels and stabilized the Union lines. Grant had two other positive situations develop. The first was the new Union line was within and under the big guns from the Federal fleet drawn up along the banks of the Tennessee River. These guns began pounding the rebel lines along with Grant's artillery and it brought the Confederate advance to a halt and Beauregard began pulling his troops back to the abandoned Union camps. The second positive situation was the arrival of General Nelson's division from Buell's command. Nelson's men had arrived at Savannah and were being ferried over to Pittsburg Landing late in the afternoon of Sunday. The Union position was now being stabilized and strengthened.

It was now after 6:00 and the sun was slipping perilously low along the horizon. From his headquarters in the rear, General Beauregard sent his staff officers to the various corps commanders with instructions to break off operations and withdraw to the captured enemy camps for the night. He did not know that reinforcements were already reaching Grant's army, and assumed the Confederate army would be able to resume the action on Monday morning, still facing the same men beaten on Sunday. Since a night action was dangerous, and assuming that the enemy was completely beaten, Beauregard issued this order, thereby laying the ground work for one of the bitterest controversies of the Battle of Shiloh, and indeed of the Civil War.

For a century, critics have maintained that the Creole forfeited a magnificent chance opportunity to completely destroy Grant's army—one more assault and the Federals would have been driven into the river and captured. Such an opinion completely ignores the existing situation on the Shiloh battlefield on late Sunday evening, April 6, 1862. It was nearly 5:30 p.m. before General Prentiss and his troops, as well as General Wallace and his men, were finally rounded up after falling back from the Hornet's Nest. (Cunningham, pps. 323-24)

The Confederate forces began to fall back and go into bivouac as the day came to a close.

THE vice of the formation of Johnston's army into three long, thin, parallel lines, together with the broken character of the ground and the variable obstinacy of resistance encountered, produced a complete and inextricable commingling of commands. General Beauregard left it to the discretion of the different commanders to select the place for bivouac for the night.

Colonel Pond, retiring from his disastrous repulse toward the close of the afternoon, found himself wholly separated by an interval of more than a quarter of a mile from the nearest support, the whole of the Confederate left having drifted from him toward the south-east. Assembling all his brigade, except the Crescent Regiment, which had become detached, and recalling his battery—Ketchum's—he remembered that the special duty had been assigned to him, by General Bragg, of guarding the flank along Owl Creek. When night fell, he moved to his rear and then to his left, and bivouacked in line facing the east, on the high land west of Brier Creek. Ketchum's battery was placed in a field a little back from the ravine. He posted pickets to his rear as well as to his front. The other two brigades of Ruggles' division spent the night to the east of Shiloh Church.

Jackson's brigade, of Withers' division, when it recoiled from its fatal attack on Hurlbut and the reserve artillery, went to pieces. Jackson with the battery marched to Shiloh Church and reported to General Beauregard. He saw nothing more of his brigade till he rejoined it at Corinth. Chalmers, abandoning his vain assault, was astounded to find that the army had fallen back, leaving him alone. He fell back to the field where Prentiss surrendered, and there rested. Of the remaining brigade, Gladden's, the merest fragment cohered; this little band, or detachment, bivouacked near the Hamburg road. Trabue's brigade, except one regiment which had become separated, spent the night in the tents of McDowell's brigade camp; Breckenridge's other two brigades were between Shiloh Church and the river.

Of General Polk's command, Clark's division, though partially scattered, rested, the greater portion of it, between Breckenridge and Shiloh Church. The other division, Cheatham's, which remained the

freshest and least disordered command in Beauregard's army, moved off the field; and, accompanied by General Polk and one regiment of Clark's division, marched back to its camp of Saturday night.

Of Hardee's corps, so much of Cleburne's brigade as remained with him, slept in Prentiss' camp; Wood's brigade slept in McClelland's camp; Shaver's brigade was disintegrated and dissipated.

In the National army, what men were left of Prentiss' division were gathered about the landing and with Hurlbut. The regiments of W. H. L. Wallace that had escaped capture returned to their division camp. Hurlbut after dark moved his division out to the front of the reserve artillery. Being relieved by General Nelson, he formed his line with its left near the reserve artillery and the right near McClelland. McClelland's command bivouacked along the eastern face of the camp-ground of W. H. L. Wallace's division. Sherman's left joined McClelland; his right, Buckland's brigade, lay along the field at the south flank of McArthur's brigade camp, and along the east bank of the ravine of Brier Creek. Stuart's brigade, the Fortieth Illinois of McDowell's brigade, and the Forty-eighth Ohio of Buckland's brigade spent the night near the reserve artillery. (Force, pps. 160-62)

The question of whether or not Beauregard threw away a significant opportunity to crush Grant's army and win an incredible victory when he halted the attack on Sunday evening has raged for one hundred and fifty plus years. The answer based on the historical facts is probably not. Grant's strengthened lines of infantry based on the compactness of their battle lines, enabled by their withdrawal during the battle, and the supporting artillery line cobbled together by Grant's officers would have likely halted the rebels advancing troops. Nelson's arrival on the field and moving into line would have brought more men into the fight and tipped the balance in favor of the Federal forces. And there was the effect of the navy's guns on the rebel armies. Lew Wallace's division was also coming onto the field having been delayed in reaching the Pittsburg Landing due to a confusion in his orders from Grant. General Nelson had reached Pittsburg Landing, but by 7:00 p.m. the rest of Buell's army was arriving at the Landing. In all, 23,000 fresh troops would be in place on Monday morning, April 7th.

By 7 P. M. the night before, all of Nelson's division had been thrown across the Tennessee, and during the night had been put in position between General Grant's disarrayed forces and our own; Crittenden's division, carried from Savannah by water and disembarked at midnight, was forced through the mob of demoralized soldiers that thronged the river-side and established a mile in advance, to the left of Nelson. Lew Wallace's division of General Grant's army also had found its way after dark on the 6th across Snake Creek from Crump's Landing to the point near the bridge where General Sherman had rallied the remains of two of his brigades. Rousseau reached the field by water, at daylight, while two other brigades of the same division (McCook's) were close at hand. Thus, at the instant when the battle was opened we had to face at least 23,000 fresh troops, including 3 battalions of regulars, with at least 48 pieces of artillery. On the Confederate side there was not a man who had not taken part in the battle of the day before. The casualties of that day had not been under 6500 officers and men, independent of stragglers; consequently not more than 20,000 infantry could be mustered that morning. The Army of the Ohio in General Buell's hands had been made exceptionally well-trained soldiers for that early period of the war.

The extreme Federal right was occupied by General Lew Wallace's division, while the space intervening between it and Rousseau's brigade was filled with from 5000 to 7000 men gathered during the night and in the early morning from General Grant's broken organizations. (Beauregard, pps. 591-92)

The Confederates were not in much better shape after the long day of fighting. While the Union soldiers were being reinforced and the lines straightened out, the rebels were trying to reorganize their units as well. And as noted by Beauregard, there were no fresh troops to throw into the fight the next morning.

The condition of the Confederate rank and file was grim. Probably one-fifth of the men who had marched from Corinth were dead or wounded, and thousands more were scattered all over several thousand acres of shell and bullet scarred terrain. Even many officers were lost." (Cunningham, p. 334)

Sunday night was equally uncomfortable for the Union forces. Tactically, however, Grant was in much better shape as already suggested.

Grant's soldiers were in little better shape than their commanding general. Many of his soldiers could not resist wandering off, trying find food or hunting for word of missing relatives or friends. Orders were for the men to stay on the alert, however, and be prepared in case of a Rebel night attack. The rainfall only added to the miseries of the hungry, unhappy Union soldiers, while gunfire from the *Lexington* and *Tyler* interrupted the sleep of many of the fellows who tried to nap in the mud.

Much of the ammunition supplies that lay around at the Landing became completely watersoaked, while the many individual soldiers were hard pressed to keep their muskets and cartridges dry. The only light was from bolts of lightning, and the men who tried to move around in the darkness tripped and stumbled over broken down wagons, holes, or bodies. Wounded horses and wounded men added cries of terror and pain to the loud thunderclaps and sharp explosions of the naval guns. (Cunnngham, p. 338)

Colonel Jordon, from Beauregard's staff, describes a situation that occurred on Sunday night. General Prentiss was a prisoner and he was bedding down with two Confederate officers. Colonel Jordon describes the interaction that night:

Colonel Thompson and myself, with General Prentiss sandwiched between us, shared a rough makeshift of a bed made up of tents and captured blankets. Prentiss and Thompson had been old acquaintances, and the former talked freely of the battle, and also of the war, with a good deal of intelligence and good temper. With a laugh he said: "You gentlemen have had your way to-day, but it will be very different to-morrow. You'll see! Buell will effect a junction with Grant to-night, and we'll turn the tables on you in the morning."

This was said evidently with sincerity, and was answered in the same pleasant spirit, and I showed him the dispatch that had reached me on the field. He insisted, however, that it was a mistake, as we would see. Tired as we were with the day's work, sleep soon overtook and held us all until early dawn, when the firing first of musketry and then of field-artillery roused us, and General Prentiss exclaimed: "Ah! Didn't I tell you so! There is Buell!" And so it proved. (Jordon, pps. 602-03)

Prentiss was clearly correct in his assessment of the situation. Buell had indeed arrived on the field as had Lew Wallace. Come Monday morning Grant intended to take the offensive.

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Early Monday morning, April 7th, 1862, Grant's troops took the offensive and despite strong resistance by the Confederate troops the Union forces made steady progress driving back the rebel troops steadily. Finally, at about 2:30 p.m. the Confederate armies began to retreat. It had become apparent to General Beauregard that further efforts to win the day were futile and retreat was the only option available.

. . . . Our troops were being forced to recede, but slowly, it was not, however, until we were satisfied that we now had to deal with at least three of Buell's divisions as well as with General Lew Wallace's,

that I determined to yield the field in the face of so manifestly profitless combat.

By 1 o'clock General Bragg's forces on our left, necessarily weakened by the withdrawal of a part of his troops to reinforce our right and center, had become so seriously pressed that he called for aid. Some remnants of Louisiana, Alabama, and Tennessee regiments were gathered up and sent forward to support him as best they might, and I went with them personally. General Bragg, now taking the offensive, pressed his adversary back. This was about 2 P. M. My headquarters were still at Shiloh Church.

The odds of fresh troops alone were now too great to justify the prolongation of the conflict. So, directing Adjutant-General Jordon to select at once a proper position in our rear, and there establish a covering force including artillery, I dispatched my staff with directions to the several corps commanders to prepare to retreat from the field, first making a show, however, at different points of resuming the offensive. These orders were executed, I may say, with no small skill, and the Confederate army began to retire at 2:30 P. M. without apparently the least perception on the part of the enemy that such a movement was going on. There was no flurry, no haste shown by officers or men; the spirit of all was admirable. Stragglers dropped into line; the caissons of the batteries were loaded up with rifles; and when the last of our troops had passed to the rear of the covering force, from the elevated ground it occupied and which commanded a wide view, not a Federal regiment or even a detachment of cavalry was anywhere to be seen as early as 4 P. M. (Beauregard, p. 593)

The decision by General Beauregard essentially brought the widespread conflict to a halt. There would be heavy skirmishing with the rear guard of the rebel army as it withdrew.

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FIFTEEN MONTHS IN DIXIE,

OR

MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

IN REBEL PRISONS.

BY W. W. DAY.

CHAPTER XV.

VALE DIXIE.

“Breathes there a man with soul so dead,

Who never to himself hath said,

This is my own, my native land!

Whose heart hath ne'er within him burned,

**As home his footsteps he hath turned,
From wandering on a foreign strand!
If such there breathe, go, mark him well;
For him no Minstrel rapture swell;
High though his titles, proud his name,
Boundless his wealth as wish can claim;
Despite those titles, power and pelf,
The wretch, concentrated all in self,
Living, shall forfeit all renown,
And, doubly dying, shall go down
To the vile dust, from whence he sprung,
Unwept, unhonored and unsung.”**

The Lay of the last Minstrel.

Scott.

During the time of our stay at Charleston, the rebel officers had made great efforts to induce the prisoners to take the oath of allegiance to

the Confederacy, promising good treatment, good pay, good clothing, a large bounty and service in a bomb proof position in return. If men had stopped to think, these promises carried with them abundant proof of their own falsity. Where was the evidence of good treatment, judging of the future by the past? What did good pay and large bounties amount to when it took two hundred dollars of that good pay and large bounty to buy a pair of boots? And the good clothing, yes they could clothe them with the uniforms stripped from their dead comrades upon the battlefield or stolen from the supplies sent to the prisoners.

But, lured by these specious promises, about a hundred and twenty-five prisoners went out one day and, as we supposed, took the oath. They were marched away city ward in the morning, but before night they returned. We saluted them on their return with groans and hisses and curses. They reported that they were to be sent to James Island to throw up earth-works in front of the rebel lines. This they refused to do, and they were returned to prison.

At Florence another effort was made to recruit men. The rebels wanted foreigners for the army, and artisans of all kinds particularly blacksmiths, shoemakers, carpenters and machinists for their shops. Many of our artisans went out thinking they would get a chance to work for food and clothing by simply giving their parole of honor they would not attempt to escape. But the rebs insisted that they must take the oath of allegiance. A few took the required oath, but most of the boys returned to prison, and most heartily anathematized the men who had the impudence and presumption to suppose that they would be guilty of taking the oath of allegiance to such a rotten, hell-born thing as the Southern Confederacy.

There was a great deal of discussion among the prisoners at the time about the question of the moral right of a man to take the oath of allegiance to save his life. It was argued on one side that our government had left us to rot like dogs, to shift for ourselves and that as winter was coming on and there was no prospect of exchange, a man had a perfect right to take the oath and save his life. On the other side it was argued that we had taken a solemn oath to support the government of the United States and not to give aid or comfort to any of its enemies; that war was hard at best, and that when we took the oath we knew that imprisonment was a probability just as much as a battle was a probability; that we had just as much right to refuse to fight and to turn traitor upon the battle field as we had in prison.

For my own part life was dear to me but it was dear on account of my friends; and supposing I should take the oath and save my life; the war would soon be over and when peace came and all my comrades had returned to their homes, where would my place be? Could I ever return to my friends with the brand of traitor upon me? Never. I would die, if die I must; but die true to the flag I loved and honored, and for which I had suffered so long. Right here we adopted the prisoners' motto, "Death, but not dishonor."

Soon after changing my quarters I succeeded in securing a position on the police force. Another of my tent mates was equally fortunate, so we had a little extra food in our tent. My health had been slowly improving ever since I left Andersonville, and with returning health came a growing appetite. We resorted to all sorts of expedients to increase the supplies of our commissariat. Ole Gilbert was a natural mechanic and he made spoons from some of the tin which he had procured near Macon; these were traded for food or sold for cash, and food purchased with the money. One day he traded three spoons for a pocket knife with an ivory faced handle. The ivory had been broken but I fished the remains of an old ivory fine comb out of my pockets and he repaired the handle of the knife with it. We sent it outside by one of the boys who had a job of grave digging, and who sold it for ten dollars, Confederate money. With this money we bought a bushel of sweet potatoes of the sutler at the gate, and then we resolved to fill up once more before we died. We baked each of us two large corn "flap jacks" eight inches across and half an inch thick. We then boiled a six quart pail full of sweet potatoes and after that made the pail full of coffee out of the bran sifted

from our meal, and then scorched. This was equal to three quarts of food and drink to each one of us, but it only stopped the chinks.

I then proposed to double the dose which we did, eating and drinking six quarts each within two hours. Of course it did not burst us but it started the hoops pretty badly, and yet we were hungry after that. It seemed impossible to hold enough to satisfy our hunger; every nerve, and fiber and tissue in our whole system from head to foot, was crying out for food, and our stomachs would not hold enough to supply the demand, and it took months of time and untold quantities of food to get our systems back to normal condition.

There are many ex-prisoners who claim that Florence was a worse prison than Andersonville. I did not think so at the time I was there, but those who remained there during the winter no doubt suffered more than they did at Andersonville, on account of the cold weather; but at the best it was a terrible place, worthy to be credited to the hellish designs of Jeff Davis and Winder, aided by the fiend Barrett. At one time Barrett, with some recruiting officers, came into prison accompanied by a little dog. Some of the prisoners, it is supposed, beguiled the dog away and killed him; for this act Barrett deprived the whole of the prisoners of their rations for two days and a half.

About the 4th of December some surgeons came in and selected a thousand men from the worst cases which were not in the hospital. It was said they were to be sent through our lines on parole. Then commenced an earnest discussion upon the situation. My comrades and I thought we were getting too strong to pass muster. How we wished we had not improved so much since leaving Andersonville. We were getting so fat we would actually make a shadow, that is if we kept our clothes buttoned up.

After considering the question pro and con we came to the conclusion that we had better not build up any hopes at present. If we were so lucky as to get away, all right. If not we would have no shattered hopes to mourn over.

On the 6th another thousand was selected and sent away. This looked like business; this was no camp rumor started by nobody knew who, but here were surgeons actually selecting feeble men and sending them through the gates, and they did not return.

The 8th came and in the afternoon the 9th thousand was called up for inspection. I went out to the dead line where the inspection was going on to see what my chances probably were. The surgeons were sending out about every third or fourth man. The 9th and 10th thousand were inspected and then came the 11th, to which I belonged. I went to my tent and told the boys I was going to try my chances, "but," I added, "keep supper waiting." I took my haversack with me, leaving my blanket, which had fallen to me as heir of Rouse, and went to the dead line and fell in with my hundred, the 8th. After waiting impatiently for a while I told Harry Lowell, the Sergeant of my hundred, that I was going down the line to see what our chances were. It was getting almost dark, the surgeons were getting in a hurry to complete their task and were taking every other man. I went back and told Harry I was going out, I felt it in my bones. This was the first time I had entertained a good healthy, well developed hope, since I arrived in Richmond, more than a year previous.

The 6th hundred was called, then the 7th and at last the 8th. We marched down to our allotted position with limbs trembling with excitement. That surgeon standing there so unconcernedly, held my fate in his hands. He was soon to say the word that would restore me to "God's Country," to home and friends, or send me back to weary months of imprisonment.

My turn came. "What ails you?" the surgeon asked.

"I have had diarrhea and scurvy for eight months," was my reply, and I pulled up the legs of my pants to show him my limbs, which were almost as black as a stove. He passed his hands over the emaciated remains of what had once been my arms and asked, "When is your time of service out?" "It was out the 10th of last October," said I.

“You can go out.”

That surgeon was a stranger to me. I never saw him before that day nor have I seen him since, but upon the tablet of my memory I have written him down as FRIEND.

I did not wait for a second permission but started for the gate.

Just as I was going out some of my comrades saw me and shouted, “Bully for you Bill; you’re a lucky boy!” and I believed I was. After passing outside I went to a tent where two or three clerks were busy upon rolls and signed the parole. Before I left Harry Lowell joined me and together we went into camp where rations of flour were issued to us. After dark Harry and I stole past the guard and went down to the gravediggers’ quarters where we were provided with a supper of rice, sweet potatoes and biscuits. I have no doubt that to-day I should turn up my nose at the cooking of that dish, for the sweet potatoes and rice were stewed and baked together, but I did not then. After supper John Burk baked our flour into biscuits, using cob ashes in the place of soda; after which we stole back into camp.

Not a wink of sleep did we get that night. We had eaten too much supper for one thing, and besides our prison day seemed to be almost ended. We were marched to the railroad next morning, but the wind was blowing so hard that we were not sent away, as the vessels could not run in the harbor at Charleston.

Just before night a ration of corn meal was issued to us and I have that ration yet. About ten o’clock that night we were ordered on board the cars and away we went to Charleston, where we arrived soon after daylight. We debarked from the cars and were marched into a vacant warehouse on the dock, where we remained until two o’clock p. m. when we were marched on board a ferry boat. The bells jingled, the wheels began to revolve and churn

up the water and we are speeding down the harbor. All seems lovely as a June morning, when lo, we are ordered to heave to and tie up to the dock. We were marched off from the boat and up a street. It looked as though the Charleston jail was our destination, instead of that long wished for God's Country.

It seemed that the last train load had not been delivered on account of the high winds, and that we were to wait our turn. But we were soon countermarched to the boat and this time we left Charleston for good and all.

My thoughts were busy as our boat was steadily plowing her way down the harbor to the New York, our exchange commissioner's Flag Ship, which lay at anchor about a mile outside of Fort Sumter. To my left and rear Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinkney stood in grim silence. Away to the front and left, upon that low, sandy beach, are some innocent looking mounds, but those mounds are the celebrated "Battery Bee" on Sullivans Island. To my right are the ruins of the lower part of Charleston. Away out to the front and right stands Fort Sumter in "dim and lone magnificence." To the right of Fort Sumter is Morris Island and still farther out to sea is James Island. What a scene to one who has had a deep interest in the history of his country from the time of its organization up to and including the war of the rebellion. Here the revolutionary fathers stood by their guns to maintain the independence of the Colonies. Here their descendants had fired the first gun in a rebellion inaugurated to destroy the Union established by the valor, and sealed with the blood of their sires. Misguided, traitorous sons of brave, loyal fathers. Such thoughts as these passed through my mind as we steamed down the harbor to the New York, but it never occurred to me that the waters through which our boat was picking her way, was filled with deadly torpedoes, and that the least deviation from the right course would bring her in contact with one of these devilish engines and we would be blown out of water.

But look! what is that which is floating so proudly in the breeze at the peak of that vessel?

**“’Tis the Star Spangled Banner, oh! long may it wave,
O’er the land of the free and the home of the brave.”**

Yes it is the old Stars and Stripes, and just underneath them on the deck of that vessel is “GOD’S COUNTRY,” that we have dreamed of and wished for so many long weary months.

My friends, do you wonder that the tears ran unbidden down our wan and ghastly cheeks? That with our weak lungs and feeble voices we tried to send a welcome of cheers and a tiger to that dear old flag? It was not a loud, strong cheer, such as strong men send up in the hour of victory and triumph; no the rebels had done their work too well for that, but it was from away down in the bottom of our hearts, and from the same depths came an unuttered thanks-giving to the Great Being who had preserved our lives to behold this glorious sight.

Our vessel steamed up along side the New York and made fast. A gang plank was laid to connect the two vessels, and at 4 o’clock, December 10th, 1864, I stepped under the protection of our flag and bade a long and glad farewell to Dixie.

After we had been delivered on board the New York we were registered by name, company and regiment, and then a new uniform was given us and then—can it be possible, a whole plate full of pork and hard-tack, and a quart cup of coffee. And all this luxury for one man! Surely our stomach will be surprised at such princely treatment. After receiving our supper and clothing we were sent on board another vessel, a receiving ship, which was lashed to the New York. Here we sat down on our bundle of clothes and ate our supper. If I was to undertake to tell how good that greasy boiled pork and that dry hard-tack and that muddy black coffee tasted, I am afraid my readers would laugh, but try it yourself and see where the laugh comes in.

After supper we exchanged our dirty, lousy rags for the new, clean, soft uniform donated to us by Uncle Sam.

This was Saturday night. Monday morning we are on the good ship United States as she turns her prow out of Charleston harbor. We pass out over the bars and we are upon the broad Atlantic. Wednesday morning about o'clock we heave to under the guns of the Rip Raps, at the entrance of Chesapeake Bay, and reported to the commandant. The vessel is pronounced all right, and away we go up the bay. We reach Annapolis at 10 p. m. and are marched to Cottage Grove Barracks. Here we get a good bath, well rubbed in by a muscular fellow, detailed for the purpose. I began to think he would take the grime and dirt off from me if he had to take the cuticle with it. We exchanged clothing here and were then marched to Camp Parole, four miles from Annapolis. Here we were paid one month's pay together with the commutation money for clothing and rations which we had not drawn during the period of our imprisonment. On the 24th I received a furlough and started for the home of my brother in western New York, where I arrived on the 26th, and here ends my story.

CONCLUSION.

Of all the men who had charge of of prisoners and who are responsible for their barbarous treatment, only one was ever brought to punishment. "Majah" Ross was burned in a hotel at Lynchburg, Va., in the spring of 1866. General Winder dropped dead while entering his tent at Florence, S. C., on the 1st of January, 1865.

"Majah" Dick Turner, Lieutenant Colonel Iverson and Lieutenant Barret have passed into obscurity, while Wirz was hanged for his crimes. That Wirz richly deserved his fate, no man who knows the full extent of his barbarities, has any doubt, and yet it seems hard that the vengeance of our Government should have been visited upon him alone. The quality of his

guilt was not much different from that of many of prison commandants but the fact that he had a greater number of men under his charge brought him more into notice. Why should Wirz, the tool, be punished more severely than Jeff Davis and Howell Cobb? They were responsible, and yet Wirz hung while they went scot free.

I have frequently noticed that if a man wanted to escape punishment for murder he must needs be a wholesale murderer, your retail fellows fare hard when they get into the clutches of the law. If a man steals a sack of flour to keep his family from starvation, he goes to jail; but if he robs a bank of thousands of dollars in money and spends it in riotous living, or in an aggressive war against what is known as the "Tiger," whether that Tiger reclines upon the green cloth, or roams at will among the members of Boards of Trade or Stock Exchange, or is denominated a "Bull" or a "Bear" in the wheat ring, why he simply goes to Canada.

Surely Justice is appropriately represented as being blindfolded, and I would suggest that she be represented as carrying an ear trumpet, for if she is not both blind and deaf she must be extremely partial.

Reader, if I have succeeded in amusing or instructing you, I have partly accomplished my purpose in writing this story. Partly I say, for I have still another object in view.

The description I have given of the prisons in which I was confined is but a poor picture of the actual condition of things. It is impossible for the most talented writer to give an adequate description. But I have told the truth as best I could. I defy any man to disprove one material statement, and I fall back upon the testimony of the rebels themselves, to prove that I have not exaggerated. These men suffered in those prisons through no fault of their own. The fortunes of war threw them into the hands of their enemies, and they were treated as no civilized nation ever treated prisoners before. They were left by their Government to suffer because that Government believed

they would best subserve its interests by remaining there, rather than to agree to such terms as the enemy insisted upon.

General Grant said that one of us was keeping two fat rebels out of the field. Now if this is true why are not the ex-prisoners recognized by proper legislation? All other classes of men who went to the war and many men and women who did not go, are recognized and I believe that justice demands the recognition of the ex-prisoners. I make no special plea in my own behalf. I suffered no more than any other of the thousands who were with me, and not as much as some, but I make the plea in behalf of my comrades who I know suffered untold miseries for the cause of the Union, and yet who amidst all this suffering and privation, spurned with contempt the offers made by the enemy of food, clothing and life itself almost, at the cost of loyalty. Their motto then was, "Death but not dishonor." But their motto now is, "Fiat justicia, ruat coelum."

Let justice be done though the heavens fall.

Since writing a description of the prison life in Andersonville, I came across the following account of a late visit to the old pen, by a member of the 2d Ohio, of my brigade. It is copied from the National Tribune, and I take the liberty to use it to show the readers of these articles how much the place has changed in twenty-five years.

THE AUTHOR.

ANDERSONVILLE, GA.

The Celebrated Prison and Cemetery Revisited.

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE:

Having recently made a trip to Andersonville, Ga., I thought a brief discription of the old prison and cemetery might be of interest to the readers of your paper. I left the land of ice, sleet and snow March 26, 1888, taking Pullman car over Monon route via Louisville and Nashville, arriving at Bowling Green, Ky., 100 miles south of Louisville, at noon on March 27. Peach trees were in bloom and wild flowers were to be seen along the route. Nearing Nashville we passed through the National Cemetery. The grounds are laid out nicely and neatly kept and looked quite beautiful as we passed swiftly by. Leaving Nashville, I called a halt, took a brief look over the once bloody battlefield of Stone River. I then passed through Murfreesboro and Tullahoma. At Cowen's Station I stopped for supper. This is the place where the dog leg-of mutton soup was dished up in 1863.

At Chattanooga I visited Lookout Mountain; then went to the graves of my comrades, the Mitchel raiders, that captured the locomotive and were hanged at Atlanta. The graves are in a circle in the National Cemetery. For the information of their friends I will give the number of their graves as marked on headstones:

J. J. Andrews. 12992. Citizen of Kentucky.

William Campbell. 11,180. Citizen of Kentucky.

Samuel Slaven. 11176. Co. G, 33d Ohio.

S. Robinson. 11177. Co. G, 33d Ohio.

G. D. Wilson. 11178. Co. B, 2d Ohio.

Marion Ross. 11179. Co. A, 2d Ohio.

Perry G. Shadrack. 11181. Co. K, 2d Ohio.

John Scott. 11182. Co. K, 21st Ohio.

Leaving here, I passed over a continuous battle field to Atlanta. Official records show that from Chattanooga to Atlanta, inclusive, more than 85,000 men were killed and wounded and more than 30,000 captured from Sept. 15, 1863, to Sept. 15, 1864. Arriving at Andersonville, I found the same depot agent in charge that was here in war times. His name is M. P. Suber; he is 76 years old, and has been agent here 31 years. Geo. Disher, who was a conductor, and handled the prisoners to and from the stockade, is still connected with the road.

I arrived at 2 o'clock, and after eating my first square meal in this place (although I had been a boarder here 12 months), I started out to hunt up my old stamping-ground. The stockade is about half a mile east of depot. Here it was the 40,000 Northern soldiers were confined like cattle in a pen. This prison was used from February, 1864, to April 1865—14 months.

The stockade was formed of strong pine logs, firmly planted in the ground and about 20 feet high. The main stockade was surrounded by two other rows of logs, the middle one 16 feet high, the outer one 12 feet. It was so arranged that if the inner stockade was forced by the prisoners, the second would form another line of defense, inclosing 27 acres. The great stockade has almost entirely disappeared. It is only here and there that a post or little group of posts are to be seen.

These have not all rotted away, but have been split into rails to fence the grounds. The ground is owned by G. W. Kennedy, a colored man. Only a small portion of the ground can be farmed. The swamp, in which a man would sink to his waist, still occupies considerable space. In crossing the

little brackish stream I knelt down and took a drink, without skimming off the graybacks, as of old. Passing on, not far from the north gate I came to Providence Spring, that broke forth on the 12th or 13th of August, 1864. The spring is surrounded by a neat wood curbing, with a small opening on the lower side, through which the water constantly flows. Not the slightest trace is left of the dead-line.

The holes which the prisoners dug with spoons and tin cups for water and to shelter from sun and rain are still to be seen, almost as perfect as when dug. Also the tunnels that were made with a view to escape are plain to be seen. Relics of prison life are still being found—bits of pots, kettles, spoons, canteen-covers, and the like. I had no trouble in locating my headquarters on the north slope. You can imagine my feelings as I walked this ground over again after 24 years, thinking of the suffering and sorrow of those dark days. Visions of those living skeletons would come up before me with their haggard, distressed countenances, and will follow me through life.

A half mile from the prison-pen is the cemetery. Here are buried the 13,714 that died a wretched death from starvation and disease. The appearance of the cemetery has been entirely changed since war days. Then it was an old field. The trenches for the dead were dug about seven feet wide and 100 yards long. No coffins were used. The twisted, emaciated forms of the dead prisoners were laid side by side, at the head of each was driven a little stake on which was marked a number corresponding with the number of the body on the death register. The register was kept by one of the prisoners, and 12,793 names are registered, with State, regiment, company, rank, date of death and number of grave. Only 921 graves lack identification. I found 35 of my regiment numbered, and quite a number whom I knew had died there lie with the unknown. The head boards have been taken away, and substantial white marble slabs have been erected in their places. The stones are of two kinds. For the identified soldiers the stones are flat, polished slabs, three feet long, (one-half being under ground), four inches thick and 12 inches wide. On the stone is a raised shield, and on this is recorded the name, rank, state and number. For the unknown the stone is four inches square and projects only five inches above the ground. The rows of graves are about 10 or 12 feet apart.

There are a few stones that have been furnished by the family or friends of the dead. Aside from the few, so many stones alike are symbolic of a similar cause and an equal fate. The cemetery covers 25 acres, inclosed by a brick wall five feet high. The main entrance is in the center of the west side. In the center of a diamond-shaped plot rises a flagstaff, where the Stars and Stripes are floating from sunrise to sunset. The cemetery presents a beautiful appearance. The grounds are nicely laid out and neatly kept, under the supervision of J. M. Bryant, who lives in a nice brick cottage inside the grounds.

I will close by quoting one inscription from a stone erected by a sister to the memory of a brother.

“They shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more; neither shall the sun light on them, nor any heat.

“For the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of water; and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes.”


—Rev., VII: 16, 17.


The writer of the above article was a prisoner of war over 19 months, was captured at the battle of Chickamauga Sept. 20, 1863; delivered to the Union lines April, 1865, and was aboard the ill-fated steamer Sultana.

This completes the serialization of the book by W. W. Day on his prison experience at Andersonville.

**A BROCHURE PREPARED
ABOUT THE COMPANY B FLAG**

AND ITS HISTORY





A REFLECTION OF THE MEN

&

THE FLAG!

THE LA CROSSE LIGHT GUARD FLAG

The history of the La Crosse Light Guard can be seen in the folds of this flag that represents the men who were gifted the flag by the ladies of the community then went to war. With their future uncertain, the men of the La Crosse area volunteered to fight and put down the secessionist rebellion.

The Light Guard was one of three militia groups in the La Crosse area that formed to address security needs on the growing town on the western frontier. They drilled, paraded, and according to newspaper accounts of the time, spent not a little time dining and honorably entertaining the ladies of La Crosse and Winona, displaying the fine attributes of their membership.

On July 4th, 1860, the ladies of La Crosse presented a blue and white banner trimmed in blue fringe. On the obverse (front) were the words "Presented by the Ladies of La Crosse July 4th, 1860". On the reverse was the Wisconsin State Seal.

WAR!

South Carolinian confederate forces fire upon Fort Sumter. The War Between the States has begun on April 12th 1861. The bombardment lasted for 34 hours and the fort surrendered on April 13th.

TO ARMS!

When President Lincoln made his first call for volunteers in April of 1861, the La Crosse Light Guard immediately offered its services in defense of the country. That same April 100 men left for Camp Randall in Madison under the Light Guard's blue & white banner. Once in Madison the La Crosse men carried their flag through the streets with cheers for the Union.


Soon the other militia companies arrived with their own names and formed the 2nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry. The following is a list of company designation and militia names:

**Co. A (Citizen's Guard),
Co. B, (La Crosse Light Guard), Co. C (Grant County Grays),
Co. D (Janesville Volunteers),
Co. E (Oshkosh Volunteers),
Co. F (Belle City Rifles),
Co. G (Portage City Guards),
Co. H (Randall Guard),
Co. I (Miner's Guard),
and Co. K (Wisconsin Rifles).**

With a combined identity as the 2nd Wisconsin, they then moved on to Washington and then “On to Richmond”.

CAMP RANDALL

The men of the Light Guard became Company B of the 2nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, part of the famed Iron Brigade, and fought and died at many notable battles including First and Second Bull Run, Antietam and Gettysburg.



La Crosse County Historical Society

WILLIAM H. HARRIES

Young Harries was photographed in the uniform of the La Crosse Light Guard. He wore a gray coat and pants trimmed with black and a dark blue cap.

**The La Crosse Light Guard
wore their black-trimmed**

grey uniforms on their arrival at Camp Randall.




While learning the skill of the soldier the 2nd Wisconsin received the State-gray uniform. Company A, 2nd Wisconsin's Captain Allen writes: "...for we were all dressed in the dilapidated gray with which we left our state,"



Company B of the 2nd Wisconsin was issued the Pattern 1855 Maynard Rifle-Musket in .58 cal.

**“WE HAVE GOT OUR NICE BLUE UNIFORMS”
THE 2ND WISCONSIN VOLUNTEER INFANTRY RECEIVED THE REGULATION DRESS UNIFORM IN
OCTOBER 1861**



2nd Wisconsin Color Guard



Silas Coster
Died of wounds at Gettysburg



Captain Wilson Colwell
Died at South Mountain
September 14th 1862
“ My wife, my poor wife.”

**“ITS THOSE DAMNED BLACK HATS!
AIN’T NO MILITIA; IT’S
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC!”**

When General Gibbon received command of the 2nd, 6th and 7th Wisconsin along with the 19th Indiana, he gave them the skills needed to be soldiers and issued the recognizable regulation uniform of the regular army. The



Hardee hat “a tall black hat” had a wide brim and a tall crown, which made the men proud to be in the army and with their newfound military bearing carried that pride into battle. At the battle of

South Mountain (September 14th, 1862),

General McClelland observe their maneuver up the steep slope along the National Road and declared they must be made of Iron.

In his report, General George McClelland wrote:

“The brigade advanced steadily, driving the enemy from his positions in the woods and behind stonewalls, until they reached a point well up toward the top of the pass, when the enemy, having been reinforced by three regiments, opened a heavy fire on the front and on both flanks. The fight continued

until nine o'clock, the enemy being entirely repulsed; and the brigade, after having suffered severely ... continued to hold the ground it had so gallantly won until twelve o'clock."

The black hats soon became known as the Iron Brigade.

The 24th Michigan joined the brigade in October 1862. In February 1863 the Iron Brigade was designated First Brigade, First Division, First Corps. Noted for its strong discipline, its unique uniform appearance, and its tenacious fighting ability, the Iron Brigade suffered the highest percentage of casualties of any brigade in the war.



MUSTERED OUT


Co. B, 2nd Wisconsin mustered out in June of 1864. Having served their term of enlistment returned home and became once again citizens of La Crosse. Some members of Company B, 2nd Wisconsin re-enlisted to finish the task of restoring the Union.

They were at Bull Run, Gainesville, Second Bull Run, South Mountain and Antietam and Gettysburg and Orange Court House, Beaver Dam Station, Rappahannock Station, Sulfur Springs, Fredericksburg, Fitzhugh's Crossing, Chancellorsville, Brandy Station, Wilderness, Laurel Hill, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Jericho Ford, Bethesda Church, and Cold Harbor.

The Second Wisconsin fought in most of the major battles in the Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania area. It may be said there is no distinguished record of service in the Union Army than that of the Second Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry Regiment. No other regiment in the entire Union Army was as active and sustained the greatest percentage of killed in saving the Union.

AFTER THE LATE UNPLEASANTNESS

Company Flags were deemed unnecessary in Battalions, and the flag stayed in Washington during the war. According to accounts, the flag was “discovered” with many others, in a basement of a federal building in Washington some years later by former Company B officer William Harries who was serving in congress. He had the flag returned to La Crosse. The old Light Guard would carry it in parades about La Crosse in years after the war. The flag was eventually found in the attic of former first sergeant Milo Pitkin after his death.



Nanny Colwell, daughter of Wilson Colwell, the sixth Mayor of La Crosse and first captain of Company B, had it conserved in 1930, and donated to the city, and it hung in the rotunda of the county courthouse, until that structure was torn down in the 1960's.

LOST & FOUND

After this, according to accounts, members of the



Governor's Guard Association of La Crosse discovered the flag at or near the Hixon house, and determined to keep it safe as its custodians. It had hung at American Legion Post 52 from then until 1994. In 1994, members of Company B, 2nd Wisconsin Re-enactors examined the flag, and

determined it was in a state of accelerating deterioration. Working with the Governors Guard, who transferred custodianship of the flag to Company B for its preservation and display and with permission from Legion Post 52, raised over \$5000 for additional and professional preservation of the flag and arranged for its display at the Swarthout Museum. In addition, two replica Light Guard flags were made; one for exhibit at Post 52 and another for use in parades and demonstrations. When the Swarthout Museum closed, the flag was in storage for about a year, and is currently on display at the La Crosse County Historical Society building and offices.

WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?

As Custodians of the Light Guard Flag, Company B is determined to attain proper care for long-term preservation of the flag for future generations. The La Crosse County Historical Society and Co. B, 2nd Wisconsin met in November 2015 to consider proper storage techniques that would preserve the flag for a longer period than the current display. Company B, then contacted the Wisconsin Veterans Museum in Madison for advice.

BENEFITS OF CARE FOR LA CROSSE LIGHT GUARD FLAG

The Wisconsin Veterans Museum in Madison Wisconsin currently houses approximately 26,000 artifacts, including 225 flags and guidons from the Civil War. The WVM has been the official repository for the state's Civil War battle flag collection since 1901 when Chapter 125 Laws first mandated that a memorial facility be provided for Wisconsin's veterans of the Civil War and any subsequent wars. Since the 1990s, the flags have been cared for in the museum's climate controlled facility at 30 W. Mifflin Street, with about 155 of them having been professionally conserved and stabilized in the interim.

Textiles like Civil War-era flags are particularly susceptible to damage from poor environmental control. Fluctuations in heat and humidity weaken fibers over time and lead to permanent damage. Light exposure in particular is cumulative and irreversible. Textiles are also more vulnerable to

problems like pest infestations and mold. But with proper preventative care, the rate of deterioration slows significantly. The WVM has numerous digital PEM2 monitoring points to ensure that the storage and exhibit environments stay both stable and within the recommended levels for temperature (between 65° and 75° F) as well as relative humidity (between 35% and 50%) as recommended by the National Park Service and other authorities on historic preservation.

Additionally, the Wisconsin Veterans Museum's custom-built storage drawers provide flat, fully supported space for the flags, and protect them from both light and dust. The facility also monitors for insects and have regular preventative pest control maintenance. And while the facility already offers a very stable environment for its flags, they are preparing for a move to an off-site state-of-the-art preservation facility currently under construction.

ANOTHER JOURNEY FOR THE LA CROSSE LIGHT GUARD FLAG

In March of 2017, after a long year of discussion and careful consideration for the perpetual care of the Light Guard flag. Post 52 of the American Legion, with the guidance of the LaCrosse County Historical Society, elected to transfer ownership to the Wisconsin Veterans' Museum in Madison Wisconsin. It certainly was not an easy decision. Such a decision involves the flag to be removed from the place of its origin (La Crosse, Wisconsin) to Madison, Wisconsin.

It is a bittersweet decision. In order to protect the flag from the agents of sunlight, moisture, and insects along with age that can inflict damage upon this treasured piece of LaCrosse history; it must find refuge along with other Wisconsin military artifacts in Madison, Wisconsin. A proud symbol of the La Crosse Light Guard, it will now rest in the repository of other symbols of service and sacrifice of Wisconsin men and women.

EPILOGUE

Much can be said about the men who went to war from the La Crosse area. But for the LaCrosse Light Guard Flag, the true credit belongs to the ladies of La Crosse who sought to show their support for the men who would carry the fight for their country to the enemy.

Throughout history, family and friends have sent their loved ones off to war, fearing the worst and hoping for the best. In 1860, in a small town in western Wisconsin the ladies of La Crosse presented a token of their love and admiration in the form of a white silk banner with blue fringe. Without this flag that represents the early struggles of a nation at the threshold of war, there would be nothing to exhibit the pride of the men from La Crosse Wisconsin.

Ladies of La Crosse, thank you.

LA CROSSE LIGHT GUARD FLAG TIMELINE

July 4, 1860 La Crosse Light Guard Flag presented to the La Crosse Light Guard by the Ladies of La Crosse

May 1861 Flag accompanies the Light Guard to Madison for training, as they become Co B, 2nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry “The banner, according to the Madison Democrat of May 2, 1861 floated over the La Crosse Unit as it entered Camp Randall” 1

May 1861 Flag accompanies Co B to Washington

1861 Flag is stored in a basement in Washington, with other company level banners (company flags are not utilized in the army)

c. 1891 William Harries, former Lieutenant Co B member, and Congressman who served as representative from the State of Minnesota, discovers the Cache of flags, and returns the Light Guard Flag to La Crosse.

c. 1929 Flag is found in the attic of former Co B Sergeant Milo Pitkin - “It was found in a frail and faded condition”2

July 4, 1930 Light Guard Flag is ‘presented to the “Ladies of La Crosse” by Nannie Colwell, daughter of Captain Wilson Colwell’3, who had the flag reconditioned. It was “placed in a double glass frame to be mounded over the wall on the first floor of the county court house”4

April 1965 The La Crosse Court house is razed, and the flag finds its way to the Hixon House. It is “discovered” by members of the Governor’s Guard Association of La Crosse, having been “placed out with the rest of the rubbish at Hixon House until somebody recognized what it was and saved it.”5 The Flag and a canvas with the names of the original Company B members are hung in the basement of the legion.

June 4, 1994 The Governor's Guard Association transfers "Ownership or it would

be better to say custodianship of the flag"... to Company B 2nd Wisconsin Re-enactors"6

1994 Members of Co B 2nd Wisconsin Civil War re-enactors observe the flag and determine it is in the state of continued deterioration. They raise \$5,500 to have the banner preserved again.

1994 Company B makes 2 faithful silk replicas of the Light Guard Flag, placing one in Legion Post #52 in the original 1930's frame.

Nov 17, 1994 Co B works with Legion Post 52 (claiming ownership) and the La Crosse County Historical Society to have Post 52 loan the Flag to the LCHS for display, after its preservation by Company B.7

Mar 11, 1995 The Flag is displayed at the Swarthout Museum.8
2013 La Crosse Historical Society closes the Swarthout Museum. The LCHS puts the flag in storage

2015 The LCHS displays the flag at their new offices and archives on West Avenue in La Crosse

2015 The LCHS and Company B meet to discuss the long term preservation of the flag, with the LCHS noting that they do not currently have the resources for the "care and storage of property it does not own"9 making exception for the Light Guard Flag due to item importance.

They recommend at a 2015 meeting with CO B, that Co B determine the best course for the long term preservation of the flag

2016 Company B contacts the Wisconsin Veterans Museum for advice, as they have 225 Civil War Era flags and Banners preserved at their facility.

2016 Company B President meets with the Post 52 commander, and learn that Legion Post 52 is considering selling the Light Guard Flag, and that the Legion is trying to determine where the flag is and who has real ownership.

2016 As Custodians of the Light Guard Flag, Company B embarks on an effort to coordinate between the La Crosse Historical Society, American Legion Post #52 and the Wisconsin Veterans Museum, the best course for the long-term preservation and availability of the La Crosse Light Guard Flag for the people of La Crosse, and Wisconsin

Feb. 2017 After a long year of discussion and careful consideration for the perpetual care of the La Crosse Light Guard flag, Post 52 of the American Legion, with the guidance of the La Crosse County Historical Society, elects to transfer ownership to the Wisconsin Veterans Museum.

March 10, 2017 The flag is removed from its place of origin (La Crosse Wisconsin) to

Madison Wisconsin, where it will be unveiled and displayed. Kept in the care of the Wisconsin Veterans Museum, it will be cared for and exhibited in rotation with other Wisconsin military artifacts; a proud symbol of the La Crosse Light Guard.

1 La Crosse Tribune and Leader Press June 1, 1930.

2 Ibid

3 Ibid

4 Ibid

5 Onalaska Community Life (page 3) March 31, 1994

6 Governor's Guard Association letter to Co. B, 2nd Wisconsin Re-enactors June 1, 1994

7 American Legion Post #52 letter to the La Crosse County Historical Society, dated

September 2nd, 1994, signed November 17, 1994.

8 Letter from Pete Seielstad to Co. B members March 11, 1995

9 E-mail from the La Crosse County Historical Society to John Dudkiewicz of Company B,

November 27, 2015



LEST WE FORGET

Company B, 2nd Wisconsin Civil War Re-enactors regularly honors the 115 men who served in the company honorably. Of that number 44 were wounded, 34 were discharged due to disability and 20 were taken prisoner. The following members of the La Crosse Light Guard, Company B, 2nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, gave their last full measure during the war in defense of the Union.

ROLE OF HONOR:

Captain Wilson Colwell - Killed at South Mountain, Maryland
Captain Robert H Hughes - Killed at Laurel Hill, Virginia
Ignatius Anders - died of wounds received at Antietam, Virginia
Oscar M. Bradford - Gettysburg
Michael Brennan - Gettysburg
Edwin O. Brewster - Gainesville, Virginia
Charles C. Bushee - as a prisoner of War at Andersonville, Georgia
Silas Coster - of wounds received at Gettysburg
George W. Fisher - of disability
George Fox - Gettysburg
Joseph Frame - of wounds received at Prairie Grove, Arkansas, serving with the 20th Wisconsin
Myron Gardner - of wounds received at Blackburn's Ford - First Bull Run
George D Hunter - Spotsylvania Courthouse, Virginia
Charles C. Jenks - of Wounds received at City Point Virginia
Anton Knoblauch - of wounds received at 1st Bull Run
David M Knox - 1st Bull Run
Marvin Lee - of disease
John M Marsh - while serving with the 5th Minn. on the Western Frontier
Robert L McClintock - of disease
Norman McHardy - of wounds received at Antietam
Uriel P Olin - Antietam
Edward Potter - Gainesville
Klaus Rackama - of wounds received at Fredericksburg, Virginia
Ferdinand Reibe - Antietam
William Stace - while serving on the Gunboat Mound City at the battle of St Charles, Arkansas

PLEASE HELP US HONOR ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE LA CROSSE LIGHT
GUARD





Governor's Guard Association
La Crosse, Wisconsin

Company "B", 2nd Wisconsin Reenactors
Attention:
Peter Seielstad and

W 492 CTH JJ
Rockland, WI 54653

Theron Ramsey
N7351 HWY DE
Bangor, WI 54614

June 1, 1994

Re: La Crosse Light Guard Flag

Dear Sirs,

Ownership, or it would be better to say, custodianship of the La Crosse Light Guard Flag has been a mystery since its removal from the now razed "Old Court House". Since there is nothing in writing and the flag has been in our possession since that time it seems that it was desirous of someone that we be selected for that duty.

Acting on that premise, our body has voted to relinquish all claims of custodianship of the "La Crosse Light Guard Flag" and grant such claims to Company "B", 2nd Wisconsin Reenactors, contingent that the flag be displayed so others may enjoy the history of the involvement of the people of that time.

Please accept this offer as our part to preserve the La Crosse Light Guard Flag.

Sincerely,

Donald Scheitzach
Donald Scheitzach
President

George J. Sauer
George Sauer
Recording Secretary



A REMINDER FROM THE

FIELD HOSPITAL

The Second Wisconsin Regimental Field Hospital offers expertise for living history events.

Both have contributed to historical events in Wisconsin, Illinois, Montana and Texas.

Companies are encouraged to contact Jim Dumke and Stan Graiewski for support.

Jim Dumke jamesdumke@sbcglobal.net

Stan Graiewski wheelerroad@chartermi.net

2017 SCHOLARSHIP APPLICATION

Second Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry Association Inc.

The world... can never forget what they did here”

A. Lincoln, Nov. 19, 1863, Gettysburg

The 2nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry (WVI) Association began with the purpose of preserving America's Civil War heritage through reenacting and performing "living history". We further that purpose by offering a scholarship to family members.

Background

The 2nd Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry (WVI) Association began with a handful of members in 1960 dedicated to the purpose of preserving American Civil War heritage through re-enacting and performing "living history". In 1990, the Unit was re-established as a result of a general rekindling of interest in the Civil War. Through the use of authentic-styled uniforms and equipment, along with drills, battles, and camp life portrayals, we believe the general public might become more accurately aware and ponder what life might have been like for the average Northern soldier during America's greatest trial. Further, and with great pride, the Unit attempts to depict and honor one of the greatest Union regiments to take to the field, The 2nd Wisconsin Infantry Regiment. With the 6th and 7th Wisconsin, the 19th Indiana, and later the 24th Michigan, they eventually became known as the famous "Iron Brigade" with their legendary "Black Hats". The original men have long since concluded their Rendezvous with Destiny in such places as Bull's Run Creek, Fredericksburg, the "Cornfield" at Antietam and "McPherson Wood" at Gettysburg.

The Second Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry Association Inc., in recognition of the importance of

keeping this history alive in modern times, is proud to offer two college scholarships with 1st place receiving **\$1,000** and second place receiving **\$500** to current Association members and relatives of Association members.

Timeline

Closing date for submission of the application is **Friday June 2nd, 2017** (all applications must be post marked by that date). If you are the recipient of this scholarship, you will be notified by email by Friday June 30th, 2017.

Eligibility

All of the following conditions must be met for consideration as a recipient of the 2017 Second Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry Association Inc. Scholarship:

1. You must be enrolled/accepted in an accredited College, Tech school or University.
2. You must list your intended field of study.
3. You must be a member, or be related to a member in good standing of the Second Wisconsin Association Civil War Re-enactors. (Member, Child, Spouse, Grandchild, Niece, Nephew, Sibling)
4. Attach a complete transcript of your grades (including cumulative Grade point average).
5. Attach a listing of your non-academic activities (extra – curricular, volunteer/community work, club memberships with offices held etc.).
6. Attach a separate sheet, containing a short essay (500 words or less) on the following topic.
“Some Wisconsin soldiers changed their opinion of African-Americans during the course of the war. What experiences may have led to these changes”?

Once awarded, the funds can be used for tuition books and fees at the college or University you

are attending. The scholarship check will be made payable to you and your school.

Award Criteria

All applications will be evaluated on meeting the above requirements. The Second Wisconsin Association Scholarship Committee will make the selection of the scholarship winner. All decisions made by this committee are final.

Financial need is not a relevant consideration in this award.

2017 Scholarship Application

Scholarship applications must be post marked by June 2nd, 2017.

Name: _____

Address: _____

City: _____ State: _____ Zip: _____

Phone: (_____) - _____ - _____

Email: _____

School enrolled/accepted for the 2017-2018

Academic year: _____

Intended field of study:

Relationship to a Second Wisconsin Association Member:

Please include all of the following when applying:

- Application Page
- Copy of your Grade/GPA Transcript
- List of Volunteer/extra curricular activities
- Essay (500 words or less)
- **“Some Wisconsin soldiers changed their opinion of African-Americans during the course of the war. What experiences may have led to these changes”?**

I will provide a photo of myself if selected and authorize the publication of the photograph and the essay of the Civil War, which I wrote for this scholarship. I also specifically waive any right to any compensation I may have for any of the foregoing other than the award of the scholarship.

Email address:

Signed:

Date: _____ 2017

Mail to:

2nd Wisconsin Association 2017 Scholarship Selection Committee Attention: c/o Dave
Sielski—Association Secretary

2316 Serenade Lane Green Bay, WI 54301

Scholarship applications must be post marked by June 2nd, 2017